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This article presents a comprehensive survey of research concerning interactions between 
associative learning and attention in humans. Four main findings are described. First, 
attention is biased towards stimuli that predict their consequences reliably (learned 
predictiveness). This finding is consistent with the approach taken by Mackintosh (1975) in 
his attentional model of associative learning in non-human animals. Second, the strength of 
this attentional bias is modulated by the value of the outcome (learned value). That is, 
predictors of high-value outcomes receive especially high levels of attention. Third, the 
related but opposing idea that uncertainty may result in increased attention to stimuli (Pearce 
& Hall, 1980), receives less support. This suggests that hybrid models of associative learning, 
incorporating the mechanisms of both the Mackintosh and Pearce-Hall theories, may not be 
required to explain data from human participants. Rather, a simpler model, in which attention 
to stimuli is determined by how strongly they are associated with significant outcomes, goes 
a long way to account for the data on human attentional learning. The last main finding, and 
an exciting area for future research and theorizing, is that learned predictiveness and learned 
value modulate both deliberate attentional focus, and more automatic attentional capture. The 
automatic influence of learning on attention does not appear to fit the traditional view of 
attention as being either goal-directed or stimulus-driven. Rather, it suggests a new kind of 
³GHULYHG´DWWHQWLRQ 
 








This article examines the relationship between two central phenomena in human 
cognitive psychology, attention and learning. Attention refers to the set of perceptual and 
cognitive processes that allows us to prioritise certain events for further analysis or action; as 
such, attentional processes play a role in almost all psychological phenomena. The focus of 
this article is the way in which attention to stimuli, and hence our prioritization of those 
stimuli, can change as a result of learning about them. This issue is of central importance, 
since across areas as diverse as social interaction, decision making, reasoning, and perception, 
people often experience stimuli on multiple occasions with important consequences. The 
evidence to be reviewed in this article shows that this experience may fundamentally change 
the way in which people perceive and interact with these stimuli, which will have an impact 
on understanding behaviour in these and all other areas of psychology.  
The research conducted thus far in the domain of attentional learning ranges from the 
basic science of visual search, spatial cueing and attentional blink, through causal learning 
and the neuroscience of uncertainty to clinical applications such as the special hold that drug 
cues have over addicts. We review this literature, with a particular emphasis on the role of 
top-down and bottom-up attentional processes. We also offer a simple model to account for 
most of the current data and suggest some important avenues for future investigation. 
Interestingly, research concerning interactions between attention and learning in 
humans has (to date) proceeded largely independently in two different psychological 
WUDGLWLRQV2QHVWUHDPKDVLWVURRWVLQHDUO\GHVFULSWLRQVRIµDWWHQWLRQDO¶SKHQRPHQDLQDQLPDO
conditioning. Here, past associative learning appears to change the way in which animals 
attend to their environment, showing that attention can be conditioned just as overt responses 
(lever-pressing, salivation etc) can be conditioned. This change in attention is then revealed 
by the way it influences later learning. Such findings have since been replicated and extended 
in studies of human associative learning. A second stream has arisen more recently in the 




perception±cognition literature, in particular in the area of visual search. This work has 
shown that learning about stimuli influences subsequent search performance involving those 
stimuli. Our aim is to demonstrate that these two research streams (associative and 
perceptual-cognitive) are mutually complementary, and that considering both provides a 
fuller picture of the relationship between attention and learning than either in isolation. 
The review is made up of four main sections. The first two sections examine models of 
attention and learning from the associative/animal conditioning tradition. One model 
proposes that predictive cues²those that signal reliable consequences²command more 
attention than non-predictive cues (Mackintosh, 1975). The second model proposes the 
opposite; that most attention is paid to cues whose consequences are uncertain (Pearce & Hall, 
1980). We find that, in humans, there is a great deal of evidence in favour of the former, 
predictiveness principle and relatively little evidence to support the latter, uncertainty 
principle. The third empirical section examines the perception-cognition literature. Here, we 
find that people pay more attention to predictors of valuable outcomes than predictors of non-
valuable outcomes. Overall, therefore, the current evidence suggests people tend to pay 
attention to cues that have reliably predicted valued outcomes in the past. Another major 
finding from this survey is that there is evidence for both top-down and bottom-up attentional 
processes with respect to both predictiveness and learned value. Hence, people deliberately 
pay attention to cues that predict high-value outcomes and, perhaps more interestingly, 
attention is also captured by these cues in a way that is outside of strategic control. The final 
section offers some theoretical analysis of the empirical evidence reviewed, and proposes a 
simple model of the roles of both predictiveness and learned value in human associative 
learning. We first provide a little historical context for the review and define its scope. 
Background and Scope of the Current Article 
The suggestion that the influence of attention might usefully be studied in the context 




of learning was alluded to by Pavlov (1927), who noted that presenting a novel stimulus to an 
animal often elicited DQRULHQWLQJUHVSRQVHZKLFKKHWHUPHGDQ³LQYHVWLJDWRU\UHIOH[´S
7KHLPSOLFDWLRQZDVWKDWWKLVRULHQWLQJUHVSRQVHUHIOHFWHGWKHDQLPDO¶VDWWHQWLRQWRWKH
stimulus, with a larger orienting response reflecting greater attention to the stimulus. An 
alternative way of measuring attention was introduced by Lashley (1929), who noted that: 
³ZKHQDQ\FRPSOH[of stimuli arouses nervous activity, that activity is immediately 
organised and certain elements or components become dominant for reaction while others 
EHFRPHLQHIIHFWLYH«6XFKDQRUJDQLVDWLRQLVLQSDUWGHVFULEHGE\« principles of attention. 
In any trial of the training series, only those components of the stimulating situation which 
are dominant in the organisation are associated. Other stimuli which excite the receptors 
DUHQRWDVVRFLDWHGEHFDXVHWKHDQLPDOLVQRWVHWWRUHDFWWRWKHP´S 
Here, Lashley argues that the extent to which a stimulus is learned about on a given trial will 
depend on the attention allocated to that stimulus. Hence, the speed with which a cue±
outcome association is learned can be taken as a measure of the attention paid to the cue. 
/DVKOH\¶VYLHZZDVWKDWWKHLQIOXHQFHRIDWWHQWLRQZDVDOORUQRQH: a stimulus could either be 
attended, in which case it would be learned about, or unattended, in which case nothing 
would be learned about it. This later gave way to a less extreme view (see Sutherland & 
Mackintosh, 1971) on which the allocation of attentional resources occurs on a continuum, 
such that differences in attention give rise to graded differences in the rate of learning about 
stimuli, otherwise referred to as the associability or conditionability of those stimuli. 
These suggestions that attention might be studied by measuring orienting to cues 
(Pavlov) or their associability (Lashley) were originally made in the context of research in 
nonhuman animals. However, directly analogous approaches have since been used to study 
the interaction between attention and learning in humans. In subsequent sections we describe 
many studies of human learning that adopt one or both of these measures of attention. 




The Scope of the Current Survey 
As the earlier summary suggests, our interest here is in the way that learning affects 
attention; how does previous experience with a cue impact on the amount of attention paid to 
that cue later? Of course, another way in which attention and learning interact is that the 
intrinsic physical salience of a cue will affect the attention paid to it and this will, in turn, 
affect learning about the cue. Physical salience refers to the distinctiveness of a cue based on 
its physical properties; e.g., a cue may be salient based on its intensity (loudness, brightness, 
suddenness), or its dissimilarity from other items (e.g., a single red item among blue items). 
Although physical salience is not a major focus of the current article, it is worth mentioning 
briefly because experiments in this domain raise issues that will be important later.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, very intense cues (those that can be expected to receive most 
attention) tend to be learned about more rapidly than less intense cues. Since this finding is so 
uncontroversial²very intense cues tend to be prioritised whatever the task²we will examine 
it only briefly here. For example, Beck (1963) exposed participants to pairings of a tone with 
an air-puff directed at the eye. Participants were faster to develop a conditioned blink 
response to the tone if it was loud than if it was soft. That is, DFXH¶V associability appears to 
be influenced by its intrinsic physical salience. This illustrates an idea that will be central to 
the arguments that follow ± that associability, physical salience and psychological salience 
are intimately linked. One way to explain the observation that physically salient cues are 
learned about quickly, is to say that those stimuli are more psychologically salient: they have 
a greater impact on the perceptual system; they are more easily noticed or preferentially 
selected. It is well-known that stimulus selection can be driven by the perceptual properties of 
a stimulus ± a stimulus is more likely to capture attention if it has an abrupt onset (Yantis & 
Jonides, 1984), or bright colour (Theeuwes, 1992). Such attentional biases driven by physical 
salience might be expected to affect the speed of learning about cues. 




However, the finding that intense cues produce high responding on test does not, in 
itself, show that associability is increased by stimulus intensity. It could instead be that 
Beck¶s (1963) participants all learned at the same rate, but that responding to the loud tone 
on test was greatest because it was the most intense stimulus. That is, the effect observed may 
have been on performance, not on learning. Stronger evidence for an influence of stimulus 
intensity on learning (rather than performance) comes from the overshadowing effect in 
conditioning, first reported by Pavlov (1927) in animals and since demonstrated many times 
in humans. For example, in a study by Denton and Kruschke (2006), participants saw cues 
made up of dot patterns and were required (through trial and error) to learn the correct 
responses to those patterns (R1, R2 or R3). The patterns could be either of low physical 
salience (few dots in the display) or high salience (many dots). For one group of participants, 
a high-salience pattern in one colour (say red) was paired with a low-salience pattern in a 
second colour (say green). The correct response to this pair of patterns (known as a cue 
compound) was always response R1. On test, the low-salience green pattern was presented 
alone, and accuracy in producing response R1 was a poor 38% (chance responding was 33%). 
In contrast, for a second group of participants, the low-salience green pattern was trained with 
a low-salience red pattern. When this group was presented with the green cue on test, they 
were accurate in producing the correct R1 response (82% correct). Thus the accuracy of the 
response to exactly the same green stimulus depended on the salience of the stimulus that 
accompanied it during training. The implication is that the presence of the high-salience red 
pattern (but not the low-salience red pattern) overshadowed learning about the green pattern. 
This result follows naturally from an attentional interpretation (though other accounts 
of overshadowing have been offered, e.g., see Broomfield, McHugh & Reed, 2010; Miller & 
Matzel, 1988; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). For the group trained with a compound of the low-
salience green pattern and high-salience red pattern, the red pattern will command attention at 




the expense of the green pattern during training, by virtue of its greater physical salience. 
Reduced attention to the green pattern will hinder learning about its relation with the response. 
A low-salience red pattern, on the other hand, will draw less attention away from the green 
pattern, and so learning about the green pattern will be more likely. 
It is clear, then, that stimulus intensity and physical salience can influence learning. 
High intensity cues produce greater conditioned responding and prevent learning about other 
cues. These observations are not, in themselves, surprising. They do however highlight an 
issue that will be of central importance in the review presented here ± the notion of 
competition. In overshadowing, a physically salient cue competes with a less salient cue in 
learning. Competition may be an important determinant, not only of the extent to which 
learning takes place, but also the way in which learning in turn alters psychological salience, 
by modulating attention. 
Our concern in this article is the impact that associative learning, specifically, has on 
attention. There are, therefore, ways in which attention can change through experience that 
are not covered in this review. One large literature that will not be covered concerns the 
changes in attention that are brought about through mere exposure to cues, rather than the 
pairing of the cues with some outcome. For example, familiar stimuli are commonly learned 
about less quickly than novel stimuli²a phenomenon known as latent inhibition²consistent 
with a reduction in attention to those stimuli. Mere exposure can also change the way that 
stimuli are perceived (known as perceptual learning), which will have implications for later 
learning. Notably, while there do exist accounts of latent inhibition and perceptual learning 
that implicate associative learning and attention (e.g., Kruschke, 2001b; Lubow, 1989), there 
are also many alternative accounts that do not (e.g., Bouton, 1993; Miller & Matzel, 1988). 
Given the ambiguity of this research with regard to the issues addressed in the current article, 
we will not cover it here: for recent reviews of the literature on latent inhibition and 




perceptual learning, we suggest Holmes and Harris (2010) and Mitchell and Hall (2014) 
respectively. Lastly, ideas related to those presented here also appear in other psychological 
disciplines that share some similarity with associative learning, but these other disciplines 
will not receive detailed treatment here. In particular, an important role for attention (like that 
described in the section on predictiveness next) has been identified in work on human 
categorization (see e.g., George & Kruschke, 2012 for review).  
Having described what the current review is not about, we now consider the scope of 
the first two major empirical sections. These two sections examine the ways in which 
attention changes as a consequence of the predictiveness of cues. A predictive cue is one that 
is a consistent and reliable indicator of the events that follow it, whether these events refer to 
presence of an outcome (e.g., electric shock) or its absence (no shock). A nonpredictive cue is 
one that provides no information regarding the events that follow it (e.g., a stimulus that is 
sometimes followed by shock, and sometimes by no shock). Two (contrasting) views of the 
relationship between predictiveness and attention have been dominant in the associative 
learning literature. We refer to these as the predictiveness principle (attention increases 
towards cues when their outcomes are predicted) and the uncertainty principle (attention 
increases towards cues when their outcomes are surprising). 
These principles are exemplified by theories proposed by Mackintosh (1975) and 
Pearce and Hall (1980) respectively. In searching for literature relating to these principles, we 
searched the ISI Web of Science database on 10/10/2015 for all articles in the fields of 
psychology, neuroscience, psychiatry, behavioral sciences and multidisciplinary sciences 
citing either of these key papers, and containing at least one of these keywords (where * 
denotes a wild card, such that associabZLOOSLFNXSµassociability¶DQGµassociable¶: 
attention*, predict*, associab*, relevan*, irrelevan*, certain*, uncertain*. The resulting 828 
hits were then reviewed for content and for references to further literature (28 extra articles 




found), yielding a total of 143 articles relevant to the current discussion (marked as results of 
Search 1 in the reference list) which we cover in the sections to follow. Reasons for exclusion 
were: (1) The article did not present novel empirical data (articles in this category were 
reviews or modelling papers) ± 137 articles; (2) The article described data from nonhuman 
animals only, whereas our focus is on humans ± 366 articles; (3) The article presented data 
from humans but these data did not bear on the relationship between learning and attention 
(most articles in this category made only a passing reference to one of the key papers as an 
example of a theory of learning) ± 171 articles; (4) The article concerned effects of mere 
exposure (latent inhibition or perceptual learning), which lie outside the scope of the current 
article as noted earlier ± 39 articles. The first main section of this review looks at the 
evidence for the predictiveness principle in the human learning literature.  
Predictiveness and Attention 
One idea that has been dominant in the literature is that predictive stimuli²those with 
meaningful consequences²PLJKWµVWDQGRXW¶:LOOLDPJames (1890/1983) introduced the 
concept of derived attentionDIRUPRIDWWHQWLRQWRDVWLPXOXVWKDW³RZHVLWVLQWHUHVWWR
association with some other LPPHGLDWHO\LQWHUHVWLQJWKLQJ´S Consistent with this idea, 
the predictiveness principle refers to the idea that cues become more psychologically salient 
as a result of their predictiveness with respect to important outcomes; more attention will be 
allocated to predictive cues than to nonpredictive cues. 
The archetypal model of associative learning that incorporates the predictiveness 
principle, and its effect on associability, is that proposed by Mackintosh (1975), though other 
variants have been proposed before and since (e.g., Kruschke, 1992, 2001b, 2006; Lovejoy, 
1968; Schmajuk & Moore, 1985; Sutherland & Mackintosh, 1971; Trabasso & Bower, 1968; 
Zeaman & House, 1963). Hence, when we talk of the Mackintosh model below we are 




actually referring to a broad class of theories that embody the predictiveness principle. 
Behavioural Evidence for the Predictiveness Principle 
In this section we review studies that have provided evidence consistent with the 
predictiveness principle embodied by the Mackintosh model. These studies have examined 
three closely related phenomena of associative learning: µVLPSOH¶learned irrelevance, the 
intradimensional±extradimensional shift effect, and the learned predictiveness effect. We will 
see that there is good evidence for the idea that predictive cues attract more attention than 
non-predictive cues. Perhaps the strongest evidence is provided by the learned predictiveness 
effect (the third of the lines of evidence presented below). Here, previously predictive cues 
are learned about more quickly than previously non-predictive cues, and they also command 
more attention as measured by tracking eye-gaze. Following this discussion, we look more 
closely at learned predictiveness and ask whether the effect is the consequence of deliberate 
top-down attentional processes, or more automatic, bottom-up attentional capture. 
Simple learned irrelevance.  The simplest approach borrows directly from the learned 
irrelevance procedure originally developed by animal researchers (e.g., Mackintosh & Little, 
1969). In a human version of this procedure (Myers, Oliver, Warren & Gluck, 2000), 
participants had to predict, on each trial, whether an outcome would occur (a rabbit appearing 
XQGHUDPDJLFLDQ¶VKDWDuring training phase 1, for participants in a pre-exposed group, a 
red or green balloon was also presented on each trial, but the colour of this balloon was 
unrelated to whether the outcome occurred, which was randomly determined on each trial. 
That is, the colour of the balloon was non-predictive of the outcome. Then, in training phase 
2, the colour of the balloon became predictive (e.g., whenever the balloon was red the rabbit 
appeared; whenever it was green no rabbit appeared). Participants who had been pre-exposed 
to the non-predictive balloon were slower to learn this colour±outcome relationship in phase 




2 than control participants who had not been exposed to the coloured balloon during phase 1. 
This finding has been well replicated (Myers, Warren, et al., 2000; Orosz, Feldon, Gal, 
Simon & Cattapan-Ludewig, 2007; Orosz, Feldon, Gal, Simon & Cattapan-Ludewig, 2008; 
Orosz et al., 2011). 
This finding follows naturally from the predictiveness principle. On this view, 
experience that the coloured balloon is non-predictive (i.e., irrelevant) with regard to the 
outcome during phase 1 results in a reduction in attention to this feature. If participants are 
paying less attention to the balloon, they will naturally be slower to learn its significance 
when it becomes relevant during phase 2; i.e., its associability will be reduced. In essence, 
this account proposes that pre-exposed participants learned to ignore the irrelevant balloon 
during phase 1. :HUHIHUWRWKLVHIIHFWDVµVLPSOH¶OHDUQHGLUUHOHYDQFHWRFRQWUDVWLWZLWKPRUH
complex examples discussed in the following sections. 
However, the support for the predictiveness principle offered by this simple learned 
irrelevance effect is equivocal, because it is open to other interpretations. Firstly, the pre-
exposed and non-pre-exposed (control) group differ not only in their experience of the 
predictiveness of the coloured balloon, but also in terms of its novelty. So the difference in 
learning of the colour±outcome relationship could stem from the fact that, for the control 
group, the coloured balloon is novel at the start of phase 2, while for the pre-exposed group it 
is not (cf. Bonardi & Hall, 1996). Moreover, the objective statistical relationship between the 
colours and the outcome differs between the two groups. For the control group, every 
presentation of the red balloon is paired with the rabbit. In contrast, the pre-exposed group 
have previously experienced trials on which the red balloon was not paired with the rabbit 
(during phase 1). Hence the overall conditional probability of the outcome given the red 
balloon is lower in the pre-exposed group during phase 2, and this may be why people in this 
group perceive the colour±outcome relationship as weaker (see Schmidt-Hansen & Le Pelley, 




2012). Notably, neither of these accounts make any appeal to changes in attention as a result 
of learning about predictiveness. Stronger evidence for the predictiveness principle comes 
from studies that control more carefully for such alternative explanations. 
The intradimensional±extradimensional shift effect.  The studies described above 
investigate how previous experience of the relationship between a cue and an outcome 
influences subsequent learning about that same relationship. Another approach has studied 
how prior experience influences learning of a new cue±outcome relationship. An example is 
provided by studies of the intradimensional±extradimensional shift (ID-ED shift) effect.1 For 
example, in the study by Eimas (1966), children learned to discriminate between cues that 
varied on two dimensions: colour (red or green) and shape (circle or star). Each trial 
presented a pair of cues that shared no features (i.e., the pair was either red circle and green 
star, or red star and green circle); children tried WRSLFNWKHµFRUUHFW¶cue, behind which was a 
winning chip. During the first discrimination task (D1), one of the dimensions predicted the 
solution of the discrimination. For group IDS, colour was the predictive dimension; e.g., the 
chip may always be behind the red cue, and never behind the green cue. Shape was 
nonpredictive, so across trials the chip was equally likely to be behind the circle or the star. In 
contrast, for group EDS shape was the predictive dimension (e.g., the chip was always behind 
the star and never behind the circle) and colour was nonpredictive. 
Following training on discrimination D1, children were shifted to a new discrimination, 
D2, in which the cues contained new values on each dimension (colours were now blue and 
yellow, shapes were triangle and diamond). For both groups, colour was predictive and shape 
nonpredictive for dimension D2. So for group IDS, the predictive dimension for 
discrimination D2 was the same as that which was predictive for discrimination D1: these 
children experienced an intradimensional shift. For group EDS, the predictive dimension for 
D2 (colour) had been nonpredictive for D1: these children experienced an extradimensional 




shift. Eimas (1966) found significantly faster learning of discrimination D2 by group IDS 
than group EDS. In other words, group IDS learned that colour was predictive in the first 
phase, which gave them an advantage in the second phase when colour was again predictive. 
The ID-ED shift effect emerges naturally from the predictiveness principle; the idea 
that more attention is allocated to predictive than nonpredictive stimuli. For group IDS, 
training on discrimination D1 will result in greater attention to (and hence associability of) 
the predictive dimension of colour than to the nonpredictive shape. This will aid learning of 
discrimination D2, since D2 also relies on learning about colour, while shape provides no 
useful information. In contrast, for group EDS, training on D1 will result in lower attention to 
colour than to shape, which will impair learning about colour on discrimination D2. So 
overall, this account correctly anticipates faster learning of D2 in group IDS than group EDS. 
The ID-ED shift procedure overcomes the problems with the simple learned irrelevance 
procedure in the previous section. Group IDS and EDS encounter the different stimuli exactly 
the same number of times, so stimulus novelty is equated in the two groups. Moreover, since 
all of the features are novel in discrimination D2 (none of blue, yellow, triangle, or diamond 
was experienced in D1), there can be no direct carryover of stimulus±outcome learning from 
D1 to D2. In other words, the objective stimulus±outcome relationships during D2 are 
identical for the two groups. The groups differ only in their prior experience of the 
predictiveness of the different dimensions (D1 training), and so this must drive the difference 
in acquisition of D2 ± as anticipated by the predictiveness principle. 
The ID-ED shift effect is consistent with the idea of greater attention to predictive cues 
than nonpredictive cues. A further question arises as to whether experience of predictiveness 
increases attention to cues (learned relevance) or nonpredictiveness decreases attention 
(learned irrelevance), or both. These possibilities can be tested by comparing previously 
predictive or nonpredictive dimensions with novel dimensions which were not experienced 




during D1. Studies taking this approach have revealed mixed results: some have found 
stronger evidence for learned relevance than learned irrelevance (Lawrence, Sahakian, 
Rogers, Hodges & Robbins, 1999; Owen et al., 1993), others have found stronger evidence 
for learned irrelevance than learned relevance (Cools, Rogers, Barker & Robbins, 2010; 
Gauntlett-Gilbert, Roberts & Brown, 1999; Maes et al., 2004), and one study found similar 
effects of both (Goldstone & Steyvers, 2001). Moreover, there are limitations to these 
datasets and to this approach more generally. Firstly, only Goldstone and Steyvers and Maes 
et al. provide statistics that allow the size of the two effects to be compared; for the other 
studies, the patterns are numerical but not necessarily statistically significant. Secondly, 
Owens et al. and Lawrence et al. did not equate prior exposure to predictive and 
nonpredictive dimensions. Finally, the comparison of predictive or nonpredictive dimensions 
against a novel (i.e., unfamiliar) dimension in discrimination D2 is problematic in principle; it 
raises the possibility that a difference in familiarity (rather than predictiveness) may influence 
the rate of learning about different dimensions during D2. As such, the extent to which the 
overall ID-ED shift effect reflects learned relevance or irrelevance remains unclear, and it 
may not be possible to resolve this issue for certain. As a consequence, for the remainder of 
this article we use the term learned predictiveness without making any specific commitment 
to whether this reflects changes with regard to predictive stimuli, nonpredictive stimuli, or 
both. 
Finally in this section we note an issue regarding the level at which attention operates. 
The ID-ED shift effect shows that learning can influence the attention that is paid to a 
stimulus dimension (e.g. colour, shape) (see also Goldstone, 1994; Nosofsky, Gluck, Palmeri, 
McKinley & Glauthier, 1994). That is, experience of the predictiveness of certain feature-
values on the dimension during discrimination D1 (e.g., red, green) has an effect on attention 
to new features from that same dimension in discrimination D2 (blue, yellow). One possible 




interpretation of this is that the effect of learning on attention operates at the level of 
dimensions; learning that red and green are predictive results in greater attention to the 
dimension of colour (for examples of models implementing this approach, see Kruschke, 
1992; Nosofsky, 1986; Sutherland & Mackintosh, 1971). The alternative view, embodied by 
0DFNLQWRVK¶Vmodel, has attention operating at the level of individual features; 
learning that red and green are predictive results in greater attention to red and green (cf. 
Kalish & Kruschke, 2000). In order to account for the ID-ED shift effect (where the features 
change between training and transfer discriminations) Mackintosh suggested that learned 
attention could generalize between features based on their similarity, and this similarity will 
typically be greater for features belonging to the same dimension (red and yellow) than 
features belonging to different dimensions (red and triangle). 
The ID-ED shift effect is amenable to either of these accounts ± attention at the level of 
dimensions, or features. Other phenomena are less ambiguous, however; in many cases below 
(including the next example) all cues come from the same dimension, and participants must 
learn which particular features on that dimension are predictive and which are nonpredictive. 
In these examples it is clear that variations in learned attention apply to individual features, 
and not to dimensions. 
The learned predictiveness effect.  The ID-ED shift effect prevents direct carryover of 
stimulus±outcome learning from D1 to D2 by changing the cues between the two phases (e.g., 
colours are red and green in D1, but blue and yellow in D2). An alternative option is to 
change the outcomes between the two phases, and this is the approach taken in studies of the 
so-called learned predictiveness effect, developed by Le Pelley and McLaren (2003) based on 
a procedure originally used by Lochmann and Wills (2003). 
On each trial of /H3HOOH\	0F/DUHQ¶V(2003) study, participants were told the foods 
eaten by a fictitious patient, and had to predict what sort of allergic reaction the patient would 




suffer as a result. Immediate feedback allowed participants to learn the relationships between 
foods (cues) and different types of allergic reactions (outcomes). In training Phase 1, 
participants learned about patient µMr X¶, who suffered from either sweating or dizziness. 
During this phase, certain cues (e.g., apple) consistently predicted which reaction would 
occur. Others (e.g., banana) were paired equally often with sweating or dizziness and so were 
nonpredictive. Training Phase 2 introduced a new patient (µMr Y¶) who ate the same foods as 
Mr X but suffered different types of reactions (nausea and itching). Specifically, each trial 
featured a pair of foods, one of which had previously been predictive for Mr X, and the other 
of which had been nonpredictive. Thus, using the examples above, participants might 
experience trials on which Mr Y ate apples and bananas, and suffered nausea as a result. 
Crucially, during Phase 2, all cues were now equally predictive of the outcomes with which 
they were paired. So both apples and bananas predicted perfectly that nausea would occur. 
Despite this, a final test revealed that participants had learned more about the previously 
predictive cues than the previously nonpredictive cues; e.g., they learned the relationship 
between apples and nausea more strongly than the relationship between bananas and nausea.  
This finding suggests that the predictiveness of cues established in Phase 1 produced a 
persistent bias in the associability of those cues that carried over to, and influenced learning 
in, Phase 2. The advantage for predictive cues over nonpredictive cues is consistent with the 
idea that experience of predictiveness influences attention in the manner suggested by the 
predictiveness principle. And like the ID-ED shift effect, the learned predictiveness effect is 
not confounded with stimulus familiarity (since all cues are presented the same number of 
times) or differences in the objective cue±outcome relationships (since all cues are equally 
predictive of the outcomes with which they are paired in Phase 2). 
This learned predictiveness effect demonstrated by changing outcomes between two 
phases of training has been replicated many times.2 Extensions of the basic procedure suggest 




that: (1) Associability can be influenced by absolute predictiveness (how well do apples 
predict sweating?) rather than a comparison of relative predictiveness (do apples predict 
sweating better than bananas do?) (Beesley & Le Pelley, 2010; Kattner, 2015; Le Pelley, 
Turnbull, et al., 2010; Livesey et al., 2011). (2) The influence of predictiveness can be 
contextually mediated. Suppose that apples are predictive and bananas are nonpredictive in 
context C1 (e.g., a particular grocery), but apples are nonpredictive and bananas predictive in 
context C2. Under these circumstances, people will learn new cue±outcome relationships 
faster for apples than bananas if these are encountered in context C1, but will learn faster 
about bananas than apples in context C2 (Lucke et al., 2013; Uengoer & Lachnit, 2012; 
Uengoer, Lachnit, Lotz, Koenig & Pearce, 2013: see George & Kruschke, 2012, and 
Kruschke, 1996, for similar findings from an ID-ED shift procedure). These findings suggest 
that, under some circumstances, attention can operate at the level of cue compounds, e.g., the 
configuration of apples and context C1 is predictive, whereas the configuration of bananas 
and context C1 is nonpredictive, so the former configuration receives more attention than the 
latter (see George & Pearce, 1999, p372). 
Beyond Associability: Evidence from Eye Gaze 
7KHVWXGLHVFLWHGDERYHIROORZ/DVKOH\¶VOHDGLQXVLQJWKHDVVRFLDELOLW\RIDFXHDVDQ
index of the attention. This focus on associability reflects the origins of studies of learned 
predictiveness in the animal conditioning literature; conditioning researchers are practised in 
measuring learning, and so they naturally use rate of learning as a proxy for attention. 
However, the focus on associability separates this literature from studies of attention as it is 
typically understood in the perceptual±cognitive tradition. So we might ask, does learning 
about predictiveness influence only the associability of cues, or does it also influence other 
aspects of stimulus processing that are more typically taken as evidence of changes in 
attention? Several recent studies have addressed this question, and have shown that 




predictiveness modulates stimulus processing in a way that is characteristic of attention as it 
is understood in the wider perceptual±cognitive literature. Here, we shall first briefly consider 
studies that have used eye-tracking. In the next section, where we consider the top-
down/bottom-up nature of learned attentional biases, we will cover other methods of 
assessing attention based on the attentional blink and spatial cueing. 
One of the most obvious features of visual attention is that it tends to coincide with 
where our eyes are looking; indeed, it is well-established that an eye movement to a given 
location is always preceded by a spatial shift of attention to that location (Deubel & 
Schneider, 1996). Attention indexed by eye movements is known as overt attention. There 
now exist several studies of the relationship between overt attention and predictiveness. For 
example, Le Pelley et al. (2011) WUDFNHGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶H\HPRYHPHQWVDVWKH\SHUIRUPHGWKH
learned predictiveness task of Le Pelley and McLaren (2003). During training Phase 1, 
participants spent longer looking at cues that predicted the outcome on each trial than cues 
that were nonpredictive. Moreover, this bias in eye gaze towards cues that had been 
predictive in Phase 1 persisted during training Phase 2, in which all cues were now equally 
predictive of the outcomes with which they were paired. So not only was  learning during 
Phase 2 influenced by SDUWLFLSDQWV¶prior experience of predictiveness, their overt attention 
was too. The finding of greater eye gaze to predictive than non-predictive cues has now been 
replicated many times (Beesley, Nguyen, Pearson & Le Pelley, 2015; Haselgrove et al., 2015; 
Hoffman & Rehder, 2010; Le Pelley et al., 2011; Le Pelley, Mitchell & Johnson, 2013; 
Mitchell et al., 2012; Rehder & Hoffman, 2005a; 2005b; for related evidence from 
electroencephalography, see also Luque, Morís, Rushby & Le Pelley, 2015; Welham & Wills, 
2011). This evidence, together with the earlier learned predictiveness findings, firmly 
establishes that predictive cues are higher than non-predictive cues in both associability and 
overt attention. But what is the nature of this attentional bias? In the next section we address 




perhaps the most important question of this kind; are participants deliberately attending to 
previously predictive cues, or is attention being captured in an involuntary fashion? 
Controlled and Automatic Attentional Processes 
The preceding sections have described findings demonstrating that predictive stimuli are 
learned about more rapidly, and receive more overt attention, than nonpredictive stimuli. 
These findings are consistent with the predictiveness principle, and strongly implicate 
attentional processes in the bias towards learning about previously predictive stimuli. But 
how do these attentional processes operate? Some aspects of the data seem straightforward to 
explain. Take, for example, the learned predictiveness task of Le Pelley and McLaren (2003). 
Recall that, in Phase 1, one of the foods presented on each trial was always paired with the 
same type of allergic reaction (e.g., apple was always paired with nausea), whereas the other 
food was equally paired with both types of reaction (e.g., banana was sometimes paired with 
nausea and sometimes with sweating). So to respond correctly, participants need to identify 
the predictive cue on each trial, while the nonpredictive cue should be ignored because it does 
not allow correct predictions. Of course, therefore, participants will spend longer looking at 
the predictive cues in order to make accurate predictions. The question then is, why does the 
attentional bias persist into Phase 2, when all cues are equally predictive? 
One possibility is that the predictiveness effect is a top-down, controlled attentional 
ELDV3DUWLFLSDQWVPD\UHDVRQWKDW³Apples were predictive in Phase 1 ± perhaps they are also 
important in Phase ´7KDWLV, the bias towards previously-predictive cues in Phase 2 is a 
conscious, top-down decision to look for cues that participants have learned are important in 
the current context. The alternative is that learning about predictiveness influences attention 
in a more automatic, bottom-up way ± changing the extent to which cues µgrab¶ attention in a 
ZD\WKDWLVRXWVLGHRISHRSOH¶VVWUDWHJLFFRQWURO. We shall consider these two options in turn. 




Controlled attention.  Mitchell et al. (2012) investigated whether top-down attentional 
processes can influence the learned predictiveness effect. Between Phases 1 and 2, 
participants in the Change group were instructed that the stimuli that had determined the 
outcome in Phase 1 (the predictive cues, e.g. apples) were unlikely to determine the outcome 
in Phase 2. If the learned predictiveness effect was sensitive to top-down attentional 
processes, these instructions should have a profound effect on learning in Phase 2: 
participants might be expected to switch attention from the previously predictive cues to 
previously nonpredictive cues (such as bananas). In the Continuity group, participants were 
told that the predictive cues in Phase 1 were also likely to determine the outcome in Phase 2. 
In this group, the standard learned predictiveness effect was expected. 
The results suggested that the learned predictiveness effect could indeed be modulated 
by top-down control. The reversal instructions given to the Change group produced a learned 
predictiveness effect in the opposite direction to that observed in the Continuity group. 
During Phase 2, participants in the Change group learned more about cues that had been 
nonpredictive in Phase 1, and paid greater overt attention to these cues (measured using eye-
tracking), compared to those that had been predictive in Phase 1. This finding shows that 
participants in the Change group were aware of the predictive status of cues in Phase 1 and 
were able to use that knowledge to strategically allocate their attention to previously non-
predictive cues in Phase 2. Furthermore, Mitchell et al. (2012) saw no evidence for any 
automatic bias towards previously predictive cues; there was no evidence for any overall bias 
across both groups towards previously predictive cues. It should be noted, however, that 
subsequent studies using the same approach have found that, although instructions do have a 
profound influence on the effect, there can also be a residual predictiveness effect (a bias 
towards previously predictive cues when averaged across both groups) that survives reversal 
instructions (Don & Livesey, 2015; Shone et al., 2015). This residual bias could reflect a 




bottom-up contribution to the learned predictiveness effect that is resistant to the influence of 
instructions on strategic allocation of attention. However, the validity of this conclusion rests 
on the assumption that the instructions given to the Change and Continuity groups were 
equally effective in producing top-down changes in attention, but this may not be the case. In 
particular, a residual predictiveness effect would be observed if some participants in group 
Change, for whatever reason, did not make use of the reversal instructions and instead 
assumed continuity between the two phases. 
Taking these data together, then, there is strong evidence that knowledge of 
predictiveness can influence attention in a controlled, top-down fashion. There is also 
evidence (albeit equivocal) consistent with the existence of another, more automatic process 
that is resistant to instructional manipulations. The next section describes further studies 
providing clearer evidence for an automatic influence of predictiveness on attention (further 
evidence for automatic processes will be presented in the section on learned value below).  
Automatic attention.  Studies investigating the possibility that predictiveness training 
can influence automatic attentional capture have used procedures based on the attentional 
blink effect (Glautier & Shih, 2015; Livesey, Harris & Harris, 2009), and spatial cueing 
(Haselgrove et al., 2015; Le Pelley, Vadillo & Luque, 2013). We review these two lines of 
evidence in turn. 
Attentional blink.  In the attentional blink paradigm, participants must identify two 
targets in a rapid sequence of visual stimuli appearing in the same location on a screen. The 
effect is called the attentional blink because identification of the second of the two targets is 
often impaired if it appears 200-500ms after presentation of the first target. This effect is 
widely assumed to reflect attentional limitations during encoding that restrict perceptual 
awareness of targets (Raymond, Shapiro & Arnell, 1992). Consistent with this interpretation, 
the attentional blink is reduced for targets that are higher in perceptual salience (e.g., letters 




among numbers, Chun & Potter, 1995), emotional salience (e.g., negatively valenced words, 
Anderson & Phelps, 2001), or semantic salience (e.g., one's own name, Shapiro, Caldwell & 
Sorensen, 1997), and which are hence more likely to capture attention. 
Livesey et al. (2009: see Glautier & Shih, 2015, for a replication) demonstrated that the 
susceptibility of stimuli to the attentional blink varies as a function of predictiveness. On each 
trial participants saw a rapidly presented series of letters, and then had to make either a left or 
right button-press response as quickly as possible (Figure 1). The appearance of certain target 
letters (predictive cues) in the series predicted which response (left or right) participants 
would be required to make. Other target letters (nonpredictive cues) did not predict the 
correct response. In a separate, subsequent test phase, participants showed an advantage in 
detecting previously-predictive target letters in the rapidly-presented letter streams, relative to 
previously-nonpredictive targets. Detection of the predictive cues was, therefore, less 
impaired by the attentional blink than was detection of the nonpredictive cues. 
This finding is certainly consistent with the idea that associative learning effectively 
increases the salience of (and extent of attentional capture by) predictive stimuli, thereby 
increasing their detectability. Importantly, the participant¶s task was to detect all targets 
presented during the test phase. Thus, there was no obvious advantage to the participant in 
biasing attention towards one stimulus and away from another; the implication is that the bias 
observed was automatic and not under the SDUWLFLSDQW¶Vcontrol. 
Spatial cueing.  People are faster to respond to events that occur in locations to which 
they are attending. This idea is the basis of the spatial cueing task (Posner, 1980; Posner, 
Nissen & Ogden, 1978), developed to measure shifts of visual attention. Recent experiments 
have used a variant of this task to investigate the possibility of an automatic attentional bias 
towards the location in which predictive stimuli appear (Le Pelley, Vadillo, et al., 2013). On 
each trial of an initial categorization phase, two stimuli appeared: a green square (which 




could take one of two different shades of green) and a set of oblique lines (which could take 
one of two different orientations). Participants categorized this stimulus pair into one of two 
categories, with immediate corrective feedback provided on each trial. For half of the 
participants, the shade of green predicted category membership and the orientation of the 
lines was nonpredictive. For the remaining participants, the reverse was true. 
A subsequent test phase used a spatial cueing procedure to assess whether the 
categorization task produced an attentional bias towards predictive cues and away from 
nonpredictive cues. On each trial a pair of stimuli (a green square and set of oblique lines), 
appeared on opposite sides of the screen for 150 ms. These stimuli then disappeared, and 
after 200 ms a triangle (the probe) could appear in the location formerly occupied by one of 
them. Thus the stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA) between the cueing stimuli and the probe 
was 350 ms. This probe was equally likely to appear in either location. PDUWLFLSDQWV¶WDVNZDV
to respond to the appearance of the probe as rapidly as possible by pressing a single key. 
Responses to the probe were faster when it appeared in the location previously 
occupied by the predictive cue than when it appeared in the location of the nonpredictive cue 
(a pattern recently replicated by Haselgrove et al., 2015). This pattern again indicates an 
attentional advantage for the predictive cue, consistent with the predictiveness principle. It 
suggests WKDWWKHSUHGLFWLYHVWLPXOXVFDSWXUHGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶VSDWLDODWWHQWLRQDQGKHQFHVSHG
responses to events occurring in that location; in this case, the onset of the probe. This 
attentional capture occurred even though (1) it was not required by the task, (2) it was not 
adaptive with regard to that task, and (3) the short SOA meant that there was little time for 
participants to consciously process and respond to the stimuli on each test trial.  
Le Pelley, Vadillo, et al. (2013) also demonstrated that providing more time for 
SDUWLFLSDQWVWRFRQVFLRXVO\SURFHVVWKHVWLPXOLE\LQFUHDVLQJWKH62$RQWHVWWULDOVWR
1000 PVVLJQLILFDQWO\weakened the influence of predictiveness on probe responding. This 




finding suggests that the pattern observed at short SOA is not a result of conscious, controlled 
processing but instead reflects a rapid and automatic effect of predictiveness on attentional 
capture. In contrast, a long SOA provides sufficient time for participants to use controlled 
processes to correct for the automatic attentional orienting caused by presentation of the 
stimuli, returning attention to the centre of the display (cf. Klauer, Roßnagel & Musch, 1997). 
These findings represent strong evidence for a non-volitional component in the learned 
attentional bias towards previously predictive cues. 
The studies reviewed in this section suggest that learning about predictiveness can 
influence the extent to which cues will subsequently command attention. This is true even 
when attending to those cues is not required by the task that participants are performing (as in 
the cueing task of Le Pelley, Vadillo, et al., 2013), or when there is no advantage to be gained 
by biasing attention towards predictive cues (as in the attentional blink task of Livesey et al., 
2009). The implication is that the influence of predictiveness on attention may, at least in part, 
reflect a change in the likelihood that cues will automatically capture attention, regardless of 
DSHUVRQ¶VJRDOVRULQWHQWLRQV. We shall see later that this evidence for an automatic effect of 
predictiveness on attention is complemented by a larger body of evidence demonstrating that 
learning about value can also influence automatic attentional capture. 
Summary: The Predictiveness Principle Affects Top-Down and Bottom-Up Attention 
In this section on the predictiveness principle, we have seen that predictiveness exerts an 
influence on many different measures of stimulus selection, not merely learning rate ± these 
include eye gaze (overt attention), spatial cueing, and susceptibility to the attentional blink. 
So models in which the effect of predictiveness is limited to an influence on associability 
(e.g., Mackintosh, 1975) do not go far enough. Instead it seems that learning about 
predictiveness exerts a more general effect on the psychological salience of stimuli that 
influences many aspects of their processing; not only how they are learned about, but how 




they perceived and demand responses (in terms of orienting) in their own right. 
More generally, the data reviewed here support the idea that attention can be learned 
just as other behavioural responses are learned. These studies indicate that the attentional bias 
towards previously predictive stimuli is multiply determined. In part it seems likely to be the 
consequence of deliberate and controlled (top-down) attention toward cues deemed important 
as a consequence of their history. However, there is also evidence that predictiveness 
SURGXFHVDQDWWHQWLRQDOELDVWKDWLVDXWRPDWLFDQGRXWVLGHRISDUWLFLSDQWV¶FRQWURO 
In the next section we consider a quite different model of conditioned attention, also 
developed in the context of animal learning, proposed by Pearce & Hall (1980). Here we ask 
whether people, at least under some circumstances, pay particular attention to cues that fail to 
predict important outcomes ± about which they are uncertain. 
Uncertainty and Attention 
The Pearce±Hall Model 
In the previous section, we described studies in which better predictors of outcomes demand 
more attention. However, Dickinson (1980) has argued that it actually makes little sense to 
continue to devote the majority of learning resources to those cues whose consequences are 
already well-known. Rather, the most efficient approach is for attentional resources to be 
focussed on cues whose predictive status is currently unknown, thus promoting rapid learning 
about the true significance of those cues. This notion was formalized in an alternative form of 
attentional learning theory suggested by Pearce and Hall (1980). At the heart of this theory is 
the suggestion that attention will be greatest (and hence learning will be most rapid) for 
stimuli whose consequences are poorly predicted and hence surprising. Following Griffiths, 
Johnson and Mitchell (2011), we term this the uncertainty principle, since it anticipates 
greater attention to cues whose predictive status is uncertain. On the surface at least, this 




suggestion is at odds with the predictiveness principle outlined earlier, which holds that 
attention will be greatest for stimuli that predict their consequences most accurately. 
In rats, there is evidence in support of both the uncertainty principle and the 
predictiveness principle (for reviews, see Le Pelley, 2004; Pearce & Mackintosh, 2010). This 
pattern of findings has motivated the development of hybrid theories of attentional learning, 
which attempt (in various ways) to reconcile and combine both the predictiveness and 
uncertainty principles (George & Pearce, 2012; Le Pelley, 2004, 2010; Pearce, George & 
Redhead, 1998; Pearce & Mackintosh, 2010). We have already seen ample support in human 
learning for the predictiveness principle. If hybrid models are to have any relevance to human 
learning and attention, there must also be strong evidence for the Pearce-Hall PRGHO¶V
uncertainty principle in humans.  
Evidence for the Uncertainty Principle in Humans 
There are three lines of research that have attempted to test the uncertainly principle in 
humans. Firstly, over the past 15 years, neuroscientists have shown a great deal of interest in 
the notion of uncertainty. We review attempts to locate the brain areas in which uncertainty is 
processed. Our conclusion is that current neuroscientific evidence for the uncertainty 
principle²specifically that attention goes to cues about which people are uncertain²is not at 
all strong. Secondly, a model-fitting approach has been taken. Some studies have found that 
models in which attention to cues is variable, and determined by uncertainty, fit empirical 
learning data better than models in which attention is fixed. However, findings are mixed and 
not all possible models (e.g., predictiveness-based models) have been tested. The evidence 
for the uncertainty principle from model-fitting studies is again, therefore, not compelling. 
Finally, some experimental tests of the qualitative predictions of the Pearce-Hall model have 
shown evidence for the uncertainty principle. Unfortunately, these findings have not proven 
to be robust to replication. Hence, overall, our conclusion is that the uncertainty principle 




does not currently receive strong empirical support from studies of human learning. However, 
this lack of support may reflect the possibility that existing experiments are not always 
optimally designed to detect an influence of uncertainty on attention in humans. Towards the 
end of this section we consider ways in which future studies might be parameterized so as to 
EHPRVWVHQVLWLYHWRGHWHFWLQJDQLQIOXHQFHRIXQFHUWDLQW\RQµDWWHQWLRQDOH[SORUDWLRQ¶ 
Encoding of unsigned prediction error in the brain.  Imagine pairing a cue, A 
(which might be a light, or a tone, etc) with an outcome (which might be food, money, shock 
etc). Prediction error describes the discrepancy between the magnitude of the outcome that 
actually occurs (usually represented as ) and the magnitude of the outcome that is predicted 
by cue A (usually represented as VA). Hence the prediction error is given by ( ± VA). If the 
outcome is under-predicted (so  > VA), prediction error will be positive; if the outcome is 
over-predicted ( < VA), prediction error will be negative. More generally, the absolute value 
of the prediction error, | ± VA|, describes the accuracy with which cue A predicts the 
outcome. If the outcome on a given trial is well-predicted by cue A, the absolute prediction 
error will be small; if the outcome is poorly predicted by A and hence surprising (either over- 
or under-predicted) the absolute prediction error will be large. Hence this unsigned prediction 
error (uPE) provides an index of the predictive uncertainty associated with cue A. There are 
(at least) three critical aspects that uPEs must fulfil if the uncertainty principle is to be 
supported: (1) uPEs produced by outcomes must be encoded somewhere in the brain; (2) 
WKHVHX3(VPXVWWKHQEHµDWWDFKHG¶WRFXHVDQGWKLVPXVWUHVXOWLQa change in attention to 
these cues. We consider these aspects below. 
Several fMRI studies with humans have found brain regions whose activity correlates 
across trials with uPE, with greater activity generated by presentation of surprising outcomes 
than predicted outcomes. That said, the exact region implicated varies between studies: either 
amygdala (Boll, Gamer, Gluth, Finsterbusch & Buchel, 2013; but see Prevost, McCabe, 




Jessup, Bossaerts & O'Doherty, 2011, for a null finding), hippocampus (Ploghaus et al., 2000; 
Vanni-Mercier, Mauguiere, Isnard & Dreher, 2009), substantia nigra (D'Ardenne, Lohrenz, 
Bartley & Montague, 2013; Dreher, Kohn & Berman, 2006), cingulate cortex (Bach, Hulme, 
Penny & Dolan, 2011; Behrens, Woolrich, Walton & Rushworth, 2007; Hauser et al., 2014), 
prefrontal cortex (Turner et al., 2004), temporoparietal junction (Eickhoff, Pomjanski, Jakobs, 
Zilles & Langner, 2011), superior frontal gyrus (Ploghaus et al., 2000), or cerebellum 
(Ploghaus et al., 2000). Other studies using electroencephalography (EEG) have shown that 
that a distinct component of electrophysiological activity elicited by feedback, known as the 
feedback-related negativity (FRN), may encode uPE; the FRN is thought to have its source in 
the anterior cingulate cortex (Huang & Yu, 2014; Mas-Herrero & Marco-Pallares, 2014). The 
reason for the difference in highlighted brain regions across these studies is not clear, though 
it most likely relates to the wide variety of different procedures. Some of these studies used 
µVWDQGDUG¶DVVRFLDWLYHOHDUQLQJWDVNVLQZKLFKSHRSOHZHUHSUHVHQWHGZLWKFXHVDQGSUHGLFWHG
outcomes (e.g., Boll et al., 2013; Turner et al., 2004), while others used gambling tasks (e.g., 
Behrens et al., 2007; Prevost et al., 2011), and others used financial forecasting tasks (e.g., 
D'Ardenne et al., 2013). In some cases the degree of uncertainty varied over time (Boll et al., 
2013; Hauser et al., 2014), while in others uncertainty was sustained (e.g., Behrens et al., 
2007; Vanni-Mercier et al., 2009). Some studies used rewarding outcomes (typically money, 
e.g. Behrens et al., 2007; D'Ardenne et al., 2013; Hauser et al., 2014), others used aversive 
outcomes (pain, e.g., Boll et al., 2013; Ploghaus et al., 2000), and others used neutral 
outcomes (Turner et al., 2004). Future work should aim to clarify which aspects are critical 
for determining where uPEs are encoded. 
To reiterate, the studies cited above reported brain regions whose activity correlated 
with the uPE generated by presentation of an outcome. Such studies show that uPE is 
encoded in the brain, which is a prerequisite of the uncertainty principle. But the uncertainty 




principle relates to the effect of uPE on processing of the cue, not the outcome: that is, cues 
previously associated with uncertainty (i.e., with large uPEs) should command more 
processing resources than cues previously associated with certainty (small uPEs). While this 
issue has received less attention, some fMRI studies have shown that amygdala activity 
elicited by presentation of a cue correlates with the size of uPEs previously experienced in 
relation to that cue (Aron et al., 2004; Boll et al., 2013; Li, Schiller, Schoenbaum, Phelps & 
Daw, 2011; see also Preuschoff, Hart & Einhauser, 2011). 
While these latter imaging data show a link between cues and uPEs, they still fall short 
of confirming the uncertainty principle. This is because the imaging data tell us little about 
the psychological effect of uncertainty on cue processing. These data merely reveal that cues 
associated with uncertainty elicit greater activity in certain brain areas; perhaps this activity 
has nothing to do with attentional processing. For example, uncertain cues will have 
previously been associated with more errors in outcome prediction than certain cues; perhaps 
the uPE-related activity elicited by such cues relates to frustration, rather than a difference in 
attentional processing. 
In summary, while studies of encoding of uPEs in the brain are revealing in terms of 
functional brain anatomy, they do not convincingly address the uncertainty principle. The 
next section reviews an approach that has the potential to provide somewhat stronger support. 
Uncertainty and cue processing I: Model-fitting studies.  The uncertainty principle 
states that cues previously associated with greater uncertainty will receive greater attention. 
Following a theme of this article, studies testing this claim have measured the effects of 
uncertainty on both the rate of learning about cues (i.e, their associability) and the extent of 
orienting to them. 
One strand of research has used a model-fitting approach. For example, participants in 
%ROOHWDO¶V(2013) study experienced one of three different visual cues on each trial. During 




an initial acquisition phase, one of the cues (CS100) was paired with delivery of electric 
shock every time it appeared, another (CS-) was never paired with shock, and the third (CS50) 
was paired with shock on a random half of its presentations. Hence CS50 was associated with 
greater predictive uncertainty than CS100 or CS-. In a subsequent phase, these relationships 
were reversed so that now CS100 was never paired with shock, and CS- was always paired 
with shock (CS50 continued to be paired with shock on half of trials). The onset of this 
reversal phase (which occurred without warning) was thus a period of increased uncertainty, 
when outcomes were particularly surprising. On every trial, participants rated their 
expectancy of shock immediately after presentation of the cue. Changes in these shock-
H[SHFWDQF\UDWLQJVZHUHXVHGWRWUDFNSDUWLFLSDQWV¶OHDUQLQJRIWKHFXH±outcome relationships. 
Boll et al. tested how well two different models of learning fit the shock-expectancy data. In 
the first model, based on the Pearce±Hall theory, the associability of each cue was determined 
by its previously experienced predictive uncertainty (i.e., by the size of the uPEs on previous 
trials with this cue). This model implements the uncertainty principle. In the second model, 
the associability of each cue was fixed. Critically, Boll et al. found that the Pearce±Hall type 
model provided a significantly better fit to their learning data than the fixed learning-rate 
model. Similar results have been reported elsewhere (Bai, Katahira & Ohira, 2014; Behrens 
et al., 2007; Cavanagh, 2015; Li et al., 2011). However, other studies have found evidence 
favouring a fixed rate model over a Pearce±Hall type model (Payzan-LeNestour, Dunne, 
Bossaerts & O'Doherty, 2013), or have found a negative correlation between uPEs and 
associability (D'Ardenne et al., 2013). Finally, Prevost et al. (2011) found evidence favouring 
a fixed rate model for learning which of two responses to make under conditions of 
uncertainty, but a Pearce±Hall model for learning whether a cue indicated the current trial 
would produce an appetitive, aversive or neutral outcome. 
We can see this as a quantitative approach. In these studies the fixed-rate models 




generally provide a reasonable account of the learning data, but the variable-rate, Pearce±Hall 
type models explain more of the variance. This is unsurprising. The fixed-rate model is a 
special case of a variable-rate model in which the parameter controlling changes in rate is set 
to zero, so the variable-rate model will always fit at least as well as the fixed-rate model. So 
in the end, whether a fixed- or variable-rate model is preferred comes down to how heavily 
the greater flexibility of the variable model is penalized; there is debate over the most 
appropriate way to implement this penalty (Kenny, 2015; Pitt & Myung, 2002). It is also 
possible that the greater variance explained by the more flexible model may reflect overfitting 
± fitting noise in addition to systematic patterns (Pitt & Myung, 2002; Wills & Pothos, 2012). 
Perhaps more importantly, the model-fitting studies cited above consider only two options: a 
fixed-rate model versus a variable-rate model incorporating the uncertainty principle. They 
do not consider alternative versions of a variable-rate model; in particular, a version 
incorporating the predictiveness principle ± perhaps such a model would provide the best fit 
of all. In other words, these studies fail to consider the relative adequacy (Wills & Pothos, 
2012) of predictiveness- and uncertainty-based models. Hence the specific support offered by 
these model-fitting studies to the uncertainty principle remains rather weak. 
Uncertainty and cue processing II: Qualitative studies.  A more satisfying approach 
would come from a focussed demonstration of a qualitative pattern of behaviour that is 
anticipated by the uncertainty principle, and which cannot be reconciled with other views 
(such as the predictiveness principle, or a fixed-rate approach). Below we consider the 
handful of human studies that have taken this approach, with somewhat mixed results. 
Griffiths et al. (2011) found some evidence that surprising outcomes increase attention 
to the cues that preceded them. This study used an allergist task in which participants learned 
about the strength of allergic reactions (weak, moderate or strong) produced when Mr X ate  
different foods. In an initial phase of training, the target cue was paired with an outcome of 




moderate strength. In the second phase, the strength of the outcome paired with the target 
increased. According to Pearce-Hall, the initial training, in which the target cue is established 
as predictive of the moderate outcome, should decrease attention to that target and hence 
slow learning in the second phase (as compared to a control condition in which the target cue 
did not appear in the initial training phase). This effect, known as negative transfer (Hall & 
Pearce, 1979), was observed in Experiment 1. However, negative transfer is not itself a 
unique prediction of the Pearce-Hall model. To further test the Pearce-Hall account, half the 
participants in a second experiment were given some surprising trials inserted between the 
two phases (the target was presented, but no outcome occurred on these trials). The surprise 
should increase the uncertainty regarding the predictiveness of the target cue. According to 
the uncertainty principle this should produce an increase in attention, and hence increase the 
speed with which the new relationship between the target and the strong outcome is learned 
in Phase 2. This is exactly what was observed. *ULIILWKVHWDO¶V demonstration of release from 
negative transfer lends unique support to the Pearce-Hall model.  
It should be noted, however, that unpublished attempts to replicate the negative transfer 
effect of Griffiths et al. (2011), by the original researchers, have been mixed. There is no 
doubt that training with a moderate outcome slows later learning with a larger outcome. In 
contrast, the critical effect of the surprising trials on later learning is typically weak, and not 
always replicated. Moreover, other studies using related procedures have found no evidence 
for a restoration of attention to a cue paired with a surprising outcome (i.e., no release from 
negative transfer: Packer, Siddle & Tipp, 1989; Siddle, 1985; Siddle, Booth & Packer, 1987; 
see also Lipp, Siddle & Dall 1993; Schutzwohl, 1998). 
A somewhat similar mixed pattern emerges when we examine another source of 
evidence for the uncertainty principle. In Hogarth, Dickinson, Austin, Brown, and Duka¶V 
(2008) design, a compound of cues A and X was always followed by an outcome (AX+: in 




one experiment the outcome was a 50 dB tone; in another it was a more aversive, 97 dB 
noise), C and X were never followed by the outcome (CX±), and B and X were followed by 
the outcome 50% of the time (BX+/±). Thus A and C were consistent predictors of outcome 
and no outcome respectively, while B was a poor predictor. Differences in attention to these 
cues were assessed by comparing eye gaze to the unique cue on each trial (A, B, or C) with 
gaze to the common cue (X). In two experiments, Hogarth et al. found that participants spent 
longer looking at the unique cue than the common cue on all three types of compound trial. 
However, this bias in gaze was greater on BX trials than on AX and CX trials. The 
implication is that overt attention was greater to less predictive cues than to more predictive 
cues (see Trick, Hogarth & Duka, 2011, for a similar, but not identical, result). 
This finding led Hogarth, Dickinson, Austin, et al. (2008) to suggest that µattention for 
learning¶ operates according to the uncertainty principle (though an effect on learning rate 
was not reported). Again, however, there is inconsistency in the findings. Austin and Duka 
(2010) UHSOLFDWHG+RJDUWKHWDO¶VGHVLJQZLWKRQO\minor differences in procedure, using 
either a 97 dB noise (as used by Hogarth et al.) or a 102 dB noise as the outcome. Regardless 
of which noise was used, this study showed the greatest attentional bias to cue A (predictive 
of outcome), followed by B (nonpredictive), and then cue C (predictive of no outcome). This 
result is quite different from the B > A = C pattern observed by Hogarth et al. Austin and 
Duka did report eye gaze data consistent with the Pearce±Hall model, but only when 
positively-valenced outcomes (monetary gains) were used. However, in a further study using 
positively-valenced outcomes (cigarettes; participants were smokers), Austin and Duka (2012) 
again found the A > B > C pattern that conflicts with Pearce±Hall. Until further replication 
establishes a consistent set of findings, it is unclear how these data should be treated. 
The uncertainty principle: conclusions.  Overall, the evidence from human studies in 
support of the uncertainty principle is not as strong as that in support of the predictiveness 




principle. While there are findings that are consistent with the uncertainty principle, they do 
not always provide unequivocal support, and must be balanced against null findings using 
similar procedures. It is, therefore, perhaps premature to apply to humans the kinds of hybrid 
models of attentional learning developed in the context of animal learning. However, the 
relative lack of evidence for the Pearce±Hall process may simply reflect a trend in the types 
of procedures that have been used to study attentional learning in humans. Beesley et al. 
(2015) have noted that the predictiveness principle can be seen as a pattern of attentional 
exploitation, in which cognitive resources become focused on the most predictive sources of 
information available so as to best exploit these sources. In contrast, the uncertainty principle 
embodies attentional exploration, in which cognitive resources are deployed to explore 
currently uncertain but potentially useful sources of information for predicting future events. 
In studies that do not involve substantial monetary rewards (the vast majority of studies of 
predictiveness LQKXPDQVLWVHHPVIDLUWRDVVXPHWKDWSDUWLFLSDQWV¶SULPDU\PRWLYDWLRQLVWR
complete the experiment as quickly as possible and with minimum effort. It is plausible that 
these are circumstances favouring exploitation of whatever useful information they have 
available, rather than an effortful (and possibly fruitless) search for new information. Perhaps 
if participants were more strongly encouraged and motivated to explore all potential sources 
of information, then evidence for a Pearce±Hall type process might emerge: people might 
allocate attention in a way that helps them to understand the causal status of the cues whose 
outcomes are currently uncertain. 
What might encourage participants to explore and therefore reveal evidence for the 
uncertainty principle? One factor that may be important is the complexity of the experimental 
design. Exploration of all sources of information would seem more likely in simple designs 
that involve only a small number of cues and relationships, where the memory demands are 
relatively low and it might be possible to establish the causal status of all of the cues. In 




effect, under such simple conditions, participants have the capacity to explore for further 
information (and may have more motivation to do so; perhaps when confronted with a very 
simple design, participants reason that there must be more to the experiment and hence 
undertake a deeper search). In this regard it is notable that studies finding evidence of 
attentional exploration have indeed tended to use much simpler designs than studies finding 
HYLGHQFHRIDWWHQWLRQDOH[SORLWDWLRQ)RUH[DPSOHSDUWLFLSDQWVLQ*ULIILWKVHWDO¶V(2011) 
experiments (which found exploration) experienced at most three different cues in any phase 
RIWUDLQLQJZKLOH/H3HOOH\DQG0F/DUHQ¶VVWXG\ZKLFKIRXQGH[SORLWDWLRQLQYROYHG
eight different cues which were experienced in overlapping cue compounds. 
A second property that might influence the exploration/exploitation balance is the 
overall amount of uncertainty present in the experiment design. In the majority of studies that 
have found evidence of exploitation, the outcome that occurred on every trial was perfectly 
predicted by the cues that were presented. So once participants had learned the various cue±
outcome relationships, they could make a correct prediction on every trial, and hence these 
designs have zero uncertainty (e.g., Bonardi et al., 2005; Eimas, 1966; Kruschke, 1996; Le 
Pelley & McLaren, 2003; Livesey & McLaren, 2007; Lochmann & Wills, 2003; Whitney & 
White, 1993). Under these circumstances, when perfect performance is possible, there seems 
little value in exploring the cues for new sources of information ± instead it makes sense to 
exploit the predictive relationships that are already known. In contrast, in the study by 
Hogarth et al. (2008), the outcome on BX trials was unpredictable: the noise occurred on a 
random half of BX trials. 6LPLODUO\LQ*ULIILWKVHWDO¶VQHJDWLYHWUDQVIHUVWXG\WKH
size of the outcome paired with the target cue changed in an unpredictable way over the 
course of training. Under these circumstances of uncertainty, it makes sense to explore the 
cues for additional pieces of information that may allow more accurate predictions to be 
made in future. For example, perhaps participants LQ+RJDUWKHWDO¶VVWXG\WKRXJKWWKDt there 




was some subtle difference in the B cue that was presented on each BX trial, that predicted 
whether or not the outcome will occur, and hence attended to this cue in order to try and 
identify this putative predictive feature. Of course in reality there was no such predictive 
information on BX trials, but participants were not aware of this and so may have continued 
searching under the belief that more accurate performance was possible. 
Evidence for the role of overall uncertainty in determining the exploration/exploitation 
balance comes from a recent study by Beesley et al. (2015). On each trial, two cues were 
presented as a compound; one of these cues predicted the outcome that would occur, while 
the other did not. Eye-tracking showed that participants paid more overt attention to the 
predictive cue in each compound, revealing evidence for the predictiveness principle. 
However, the absolute accuracy with which the predictive cues allowed the outcome to be 
predicted was systematically varied (between-subjects in one experiment and within-subjects 
in another). IQWKHµFHUWDLQ¶FRQGLWLRQ, the predictive cues allowed the outcome to be predicted 
with 100% accuracy; in the µXQFHUWDLQ¶FRQGLWLRQ, the predictive cues allowed the outcome to 
be predicted with only 67% accuracy. Notably, overt attention to all cues (both predictive and 
nonpredictive) was greater in the uncertain condition than the certain condition; that is, 
participants spent a greater proportion of each trial looking at the cues in the uncertain 
condition. This finding of greater attention to cues under conditions of greater uncertainty 
accords with the uncertainty principle embodied by the Pearce±Hall model, and with the 
suggestion that uncertainty drives attentional exploration of cues for prediction-relevant 
information. 
7DNHQWRJHWKHU%HHVOH\HWDO¶V(2015) findings suggest that uncertainty might 
influence attention based on the overall uncertainty of the prediction made by all presented 
cues (i.e., given this set of cues, how uncertain am I of the outcome that will occur?), while 
predictiveness operates at the level of the individual cues (which of the N cues that were 




presented was individually the best predictor of the outcome?). This suggestion is consistent 
with the original characterizations of uncertainty-driven and predictiveness-driven processes 
in the models of Pearce & Hall (1980) and Mackintosh (1975) respectively, and offers one 
way in which the predictiveness and uncertainty principles²which at first glance seem to be 
mutually contradictory²might be reconciled (see Le Pelley, 2004, 2010, for a hybrid model 
along these lines). However, while Beesley et al.¶V findings are promising, research into the 
experimental parameters and procedures that might reveal evidence for the uncertainty 
principle is at an early stage; as such, the possibilities raised above are currently largely 
speculation. Indeed, the notion of overall uncertainty cannot be the whole story. As far as we 
are aware, it is true that all studies supporting the uncertainty principle have used procedures 
in which the outcome cannot be predicted perfectly on each trial. However, there are also a 
handful of studies that have used procedures in which the outcome cannot be predicted 
perfectly, but which have yielded evidence consistent with the predictiveness principle (and 
counter to the uncertainty principle: Kattner, 2015; Le Pelley, Turnbull, et al., 2010; Livesey 
et al., 2011). Future research should aim to establish systematically what, if any, are the 
factors that determine whether a pattern of attentional exploitation (following the 
predictiveness principle) or exploration (following the uncertainty principle) will be observed. 
Summary: Predictiveness versus uncertainty 
The preceding sections describe a body of evidence showing that the attention paid to a 
stimulus is influenced by the accuracy with which it predicts subsequent events. We have 
seen that there is strong evidence supporting the operation of the predictiveness principle in 
humans ± the idea that more attention will be paid to cues that are more accurate predictors of 
subsequent events. There is also some evidence (certainly less abundant and arguably less 
compelling) in support of the uncertainty principle. This is (superficially at least) the opposite 




of the predictiveness principle, and describes a process whereby greater attention is allocated 
to cues paired with outcomes that are less accurately predicted (i.e., more surprising). Hybrid 
models incorporating both of these principles have been put forward in the context of animal 
learning theory, though it remains for future empirical work to establish more convincingly 
whether both of these mechanisms operate in humans. 
Before moving on, we note briefly that there are certain phenomena demonstrating a 
relationship between learning and attention that are anticipated by both the predictiveness 
principle and the uncertainty principle. A prime example is blocking. In blocking, pairings of 
cue A with an outcome are followed by pairings of an AB compound with the same outcome. 
Less is learned about the contingency between cue B and the outcome than for a control cue 
D, trained in a CD compound where C was not previously paired with the outcome. Thus 
learning about B on ABooutcome trials is blocked by prior learning of the Aooutcome 
relationship. Several studies with humans show that blocking treatment results in a reduction 
to attention to the blocked cue B relative to the control cue D. These include studies 
measuring attention in terms of associability (Beesley & Le Pelley, 2011; Griffiths & Le 
Pelley, 2009; Kruschke & Blair, 2000; Le Pelley, Beesley & Suret, 2007; Le Pelley, 
Oakeshott & McLaren, 2005; Liu & Luhmann, 2013; Mitchell, Harris, Westbrook & Griffiths, 
2008), eye gaze (Beesley & Le Pelley, 2011; Eippert, Gamer & Buchel, 2012; Kruschke, 
Kappenman & Hetrick, 2005; Le Pelley, Beesley & Griffiths, 2014; Wills, Lavric, Croft & 
Hodgson, 2007), recognition memory (Griffiths & Mitchell, 2008), DQGµneural PDUNHUV¶RI
selective attention recorded using electroencephalography (EEG: Wills et al., 2007; but see 
also Kopp & Wolff, 2000, for a null result). The pattern of reduced attention to B emerges 
from the predictiveness principle because B is a poorer predictor of the outcome on 
ABooutcome trials than is A, as a result of prior training with A alone. The same pattern 
emerges from the uncertainty principle because prior training with A renders the outcome on 




ABooutcome trials unsurprising, compared to the outcome on CDooutcome trials which is 
surprising because neither cue has been pretrained. That is, the overall uncertainty associated 
with the AB compound is lower than that associated with the CD compound, and so²on the 
basis of the idea (raised earlier) that overall uncertainty may be the crucial determinant of 
attention (Pearce & Hall, 1980)²the uncertainty principle anticipates a reduction in attention 
to cues belonging to a low-uncertainty compound (A and B) relative to cues in a high-
uncertainty compound (C and D).3  
Other studies that are consistent with both the predictiveness and uncertainty principles 
have examined how attention to contexts varies as a function of the information learned in 
them (Abad, Ramos-Alvarez & Rosas, 2009; Callejas-Aguilera & Rosas, 2010; Gawronski, 
Rydell, Vervliet & De Houwer, 2010; Leon, Abad & Rosas, 2011; Nelson, Lamoureux & 
Leon, 2013; Rosas & Callejas-Aguilera, 2006). In essence, in these studies people initially 
learn that whenever Mr X eats a particular food (say steak) in restaurant R he suffers illness, 
but other foods eaten in this restaurant do not cause illness. Later, this relationship is 
extinguished: steak eaten in restaurant R no longer causes illness. Evidence suggests that this 
treatment results in an increase in attention to the context (restaurant R: see Nelson et al., 
2013; Rosas & Callejas-Aguilera, 2006: see also Dunsmoor, Campese, Ceceli, LeDoux & 
Phelps, 2015; Lucke, Lachnit, Stuttgen & Uengoer, 2014). This finding follows from the 
predictiveness principle because, during the extinction phase, the restaurant is a better 
SUHGLFWRURIµQRLOOQHVV¶WKDQLVVWHDNVLQFHVWHDNKDVDVWURQJSUH-trained association with 
illness). It also follows from the uncertainty principle because, on early extinction trials, the 
occurreQFHRIµQRLOOQHVV¶DIWHUHDWLQJVWHDNDWUHVWDXUDQW5LVVXUSULVLQJDQGKHQFHDFFRUGLQJ
to the Pearce±Hall model) will result in an increase in attention to all presented stimuli, which 
includes the restaurant. 
 To reiterate, these findings, like those reviewed in previous sections, provide further 




evidence of a relationship between attention and learning about predictiveness. But because 
they do not provide selective support for any particular account of this relationship we will 
not consider them further here. 
Learned Value 
In the preceding discussion, we have considered the effect on attention of learning about 
differences in the predictiveness of cues; that is, the consistency or variability of the outcome 
that follows a particular cue. A predictive cue is one that is consistently followed by the same 
outcome, while a nonpredictive cue is one that is followed (unpredictably) by different 
outcomes. However, an emerging body of research suggests this is not the whole story; that 
attention to cues is also influenced by the motivational value of the outcome events they are 
paired with ± what we term the learned value of the stimuli. That is, while attention tends to 
increase towards cues that reliably signal their outcomes, even greater attention will be paid 
to cues that reliably signal the outcomes that have the highest value. 
To date, the majority of studies investigating the effect of learned value on attention 
have manipulated the monetary reward associated with cues (though later we shall see some 
alternative examples). In essence these studies all take a similar approach. Suppose cue X is 
consistently paired with a relatively large reward (say 10¢), and cue Y is consistently paired 
with a smaller reward (1¢). Under these circumstances, X and Y have equal predictiveness, 
since both are perfect predictors of the outcome with which they are paired. The critical 
question is whether learning about these cue±outcome relationships leads to greater attention 
being paid to the high-reward cue X than to the low-reward cue Y. 
Three key empirical papers have provided a great deal of the impetus behind the recent 
body of research investigating the influence of learned value on attention: Anderson, Laurent 
and Yantis (2011b), Della Libera and Chelazzi (2009), and Raymond and O'Brien (2009). In 




searching for literature relating to this field, we searched ISI Web of Science on 19/10/2015 
for all articles in the fields of psychology, neuroscience, psychiatry, behavioral sciences and 
multidisciplinary sciences citing one or more of these key papers. The resulting 195 hits were 
reviewed for content and for references to other relevant articles (4 found). This yielded 86 
articles relevant to the current discussion (marked as results of Search 2 in the reference list), 
which we cover in the sections to follow. Reasons for exclusion were: (1) The article did not 
present novel empirical data (articles in this category were reviews or modelling papers) ± 14 
articles; (2) The article described data from nonhuman animals only, whereas our focus is on 
humans ± 9 articles; (3) The article presented data from humans, but did not bear on the 
question of how learning changes attention to cues ± 86 articles. Most articles in this category 
made only a passing reference to one of the key papers as providing an example of a factor 
(reward) that influences attention (47 articles). Others described studies that did not involve 
learning a relationship between a stimulus and a value-related outcome (reward or 
punishment: 24 articles), or did not measure attention (7 articles). Finally 8 articles described 
studies measuring learning of an arbitrary attentional response: e.g., when cue X appears in 
the centre of the screen, participants are rewarded for making a saccade to the left. These 
studies are irrelevant for current purposes, as we are interested in how reward influences the 
attention that is paid to the cue itself. 
The evidence reviewed below comes in two kinds. In some studies, the cues that predict 
the valued rewards are task-relevant ± participants must do something with them in order to 
complete a task. In other studies, the cues that predict valued rewards are task-irrelevant: 
participants are never required to attend to them²indeed, must ignore them²in order to 
complete the task. For example, when looking through a drawer for my keys, the keys are the 
task-relevant stimulus. Other items in the drawer (balls of string, batteries etc) that are not the 
object of my search²and which may even impede my search²are task-irrelevant stimuli. 




There is strong evidence for a top-down, deliberate, value-based attentional bias when the 
cues in question are task-relevant. We review this evidence first. Following this, we describe 
evidence from studies using task-irrelevant cues, which shows that learned value can also 
result in bottom-up, automatic attentional capture. 
Reward Influences Attention to Task-Relevant Stimuli 
It is now well established that the learned value of stimuli influences performance on tasks in 
which they are task-relevant. For example, in a study of visual search, Stormer, Eppinger and 
Li (2014) had participants locate, and report the orientation of, a T shape (the target) among 
rotated L shapes (distractors) on each trial. They received a reward for each correct response, 
with the size of this reward depending on the colour in which the target T was presented. For 
example, a correct response to a red T may yield a relatively large reward (5¢), but a green T 
may yield smaller reward (1¢). Each of the distractors was rendered in a distinct, randomly 
chosen colour (but not one of the colours in which the target could appear; red or green in this 
example). Over the course of training, participants became faster to respond to targets 
rendered in the high-reward colour than the low-reward colour. This finding suggests that 
learning about the rewards associated with stimuli modulated attention to those stimuli; 
greater attention allocated to the high-reward target colour than the low-reward colour.  
A crucial question, addressed earlier in the context of learned predictiveness, is whether 
this learned YDOXHHIIHFWLVXQGHUSDUWLFLSDQWV¶FRQWUROWRS-down) or is automatic (bottom-up). 
A top-GRZQDFFRXQWRI6WRUPHUHWDO¶VILQGLQJVZRXOGDUJXHWKDWKDYLQJOHDUQHGWKDW
locating a red target was worth more than locating a green target, people strategically 
reallocated attentional resources to prioritize processing of red stimuli (cf. Duncan, 1989; 
Wolfe, Butcher, Lee & Hyle, 2003). A bottom-up account supposes that training changes the 
extent to which those FRORXUVDXWRPDWLFDOO\FDSWXUHDWWHQWLRQUHJDUGOHVVRIWKHSDUWLFLSDQW¶V
intentions. In this case, reward learning makes the high-reward colour more psychologically 




VDOLHQWVRWKDWLWµOHDSVRXW¶IURPWKHGLVSOD\DQGLVORFDWHGPRUe quickly. While Stormer et 
DO¶VILQGLQJVGHPRQVWUDWHDQLQIOXHQFHRIOHDUQHGYDOXHRQDWWHQWLRQWKH\ do not allow us to 
decide between these alternative accounts of that influence. This is because the stimuli that 
predicted reward (red and green colours) were task-relevant throughout the task ± they 
defined the targets to which participants responded in order to earn that reward. Consequently 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶JRDOV(locate valuable stimuli) were aligned with the reward structure of the task, 
such that top-down and bottom-up accounts anticipate the same pattern of behaviour. 
Several other recent studies have found similar evidence consistent with an effect of 
learned value on attention to task-relevant, reward-related stimuli.4 All of these examples 
could potentially be explained by a top-down influence of learned value on attention, a 
bottom-up influence, or a combination of the two. In some cases it would appear that top-
down processes are contributing, since attention is influenced by verbal instructions regarding 
reward relationships even in the absence of further stimulus±reward training that would be 
required to alter bottom-up attention (Le Pelley, Mitchell, et al., 2013; Stankevich & Geng, 
2015). In other cases it seems that bottom-up processes may be at work. For example, prior 
association with large reward facilitates visual search for stimuli even if these stimuli are 
colour singletons (e.g., a single red target circle among several blue distractors: Kiss et al., 
2009; Kristjansson et al., 2010). It is often assumed that such singleton search primarily 
reflects the operation of rapid, bottom-up attentional processes due to the physical salience of 
the target, so it seems plausible that reward might be modulating the operation of this bottom-
up process (see also O'Brien & Raymond, 2012; Stankevich & Geng, 2015, for further 
evidence consistent with a rapid influence of learned value). 
So, we have evidence consistent with an influence of learned value on top-down 
attention. This is unsurprising, and should be uncontentious. If I have learned that responding 
to stimuli appearing in location X produces a large reward, while responding to stimuli in 




location Y produces small reward, then clearly I ought to prioritise location X rather than 
location Y so as to maximize my payoff (see Chelazzi, Perlato, Santandrea & Della Libera, 
2013; Maunsell, 2004). More exciting is the possibility that learned value might exert an 
automatic effect on attentional capture that is outside of parWLFLSDQWV¶VWUDWHJLFFRQWURO:KLOH
the studies reviewed above are (arguably) suggestive of such an effect, work using task-
irrelevant cues has yielded more conclusive evidence. 
Value-Modulated Attentional Capture by Task-Irrelevant Stimuli 
As noted above, the reason the studies in the previous section have trouble discriminating 
between goal-directed and automatic accounts is because SHRSOH¶V goals were aligned with 
WKHWDVN¶VUHZDUGVWUXFWXUHStudies using task-irrelevant cues have solved this problem by 
HIIHFWLYHO\GHFRXSOLQJSDUWLFLSDQWV¶JRDOVIURPWKHUHZDUGVWUXFWXUH, so that the relationship 
between cues and reward is incidental to the task participants are engaged in. Most of this 
work has been in visual search and related tasks requiring allocation of spatial attention, and 
hence we focus on this area, though we will also cover approaches based on nonspatial tasks. 
Learned value in spatial tasks.  There are three ways in which spatial tasks have been 
used to look at learned value for task-irrelevant cues. Firstly, cues can be task-relevant in a 
training phase where they are paired with reward, but then task-irrelevant on a later test. On 
test, attention to the pretrained cues is measured by the extent to which they distract attention 
from the task participants are engaged in. We refer to these as training phase ± test phase 
procedures. Secondly, in intertrial priming procedures, cues can predict reward on one trial, 
and then serve as distractors on the next trial. Finally, cues can be scheduled to signal reward, 
but never be the target of the task participants are performing. Below we review evidence 
from each of these three approaches for an influence of learned value on automatic attentional 
capture. 




Training phase ± test phase procedures.  Perhaps the most common procedure for 
studying the relationship between learned value and attention was developed by Anderson et 
al. (2011b). Each trial of an initial training phase presented six differently coloured circles 
(Figure 2a). Each display contained a target circle, which could be red or green. Participants 
responded as rapidly as possible to the orientation (vertical or horizontal) of a line inside the 
target circle. Fast, correct responses were rewarded, with the amount of reward related to the 
colour of the target (red or green) on that trial. One of the target colours (the high-value 
colour) was typically paired with high reward (5¢); the other, low-value target colour was 
typically paired with low reward (1¢). 
After extensive training on this task, participants moved on to a test phase, in which no 
further rewards were delivered. During the test phase, the target on each trial was now 
defined by shape; say, a diamond among circles (Figure 2b). Hence colour was now task-
irrelevant, since it did not define the target. Critically, people were slower to respond to the 
shape-singleton target if the display contained a distractor shape in the high-value colour 
(known as high-value distractor trials) than if neither of the reward-related colours was 
present in the display (no-distractor trials: note, the comparison here does not include low-
value distractor trials, we return to this issue later). This finding suggests that participDQWV¶
prior experience with the high-value target colour during the training phase made it more 
likely to distract attention away from the target in the test phase. Notably, since colour was 
task-irrelevant in the test phase, there was no reason to strategically orient attention to red or 
green stimuli. The implication is that the high-value distractor colour produced automatic and 
involuntary capture of attention. Several subsequent studies have replicated the finding of 
slower responses during the test phase on high-value distractor trials compared to no-
distractor trials (Anderson, Faulkner, Rilee, Yantis & Marvel, 2013; Anderson, Laurent & 
Yantis, 2013, 2014; Anderson, Leal, Hall, Yassa & Yantis, 2014; Anderson & Yantis, 2012; 




Laurent, Hall, Anderson & Yantis, 2015; Qi, Zeng, Ding & Li, 2013; Roper, Vecera & 
Vaidya, 2014; Sali, Anderson & Yantis, 2014; Wang, Yu & Zhou, 2013). 
However, there is a problem of interpretation here. Attentional capture by the high-
value colour (say, red) during the test phase may not be driven by its learned value, but 
because this colour defined the target during the preceding training phase. So the fact that red 
continues to capture attention during the test phase may simply reflect a difficulty in 
inhibiting an old task-set (locate red and green stimuli) and adopting a new one (locate shape 
singleton), regardless of reward. In other words, red may capture attention because it has 
been responded to as a target many times in the past, an effect known as selection history 
(Awh, Belopolsky & Theeuwes, 2012; Kyllingsbaek, Schneider & Bundesen, 2001). 
Anderson et al. (2011b; see also Qi et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2013) attempted to rule 
out this non-reward-based account. They repeated their original study, but provided no 
rewards during the initial training phase. In this unrewarded control condition, no significant 
difference in response time was observed during the test phase between trials featuring a 
distractor in a colour that had been a target during training (red or green) versus no-distractor 
trials. This null result suggests that, in this procedure, selection history alone does not 
produce capture by former targets. The implication is that capture by the former high-reward 
target in the rewarded version of the task is a product of its learned value, and not merely 
because it has previously been a target. Caveats are needed here, though. Neither Anderson et 
al. nor Qi et al. tested whether capture by the former target was significantly greater in a 
rewarded procedure than in an unrewarded procedure, so these studies do not provide a 
robust test of the claim that reward is the critical variable. Wang et al. are alone in testing this 
critical interaction, which they did find to be significant. The majority of studies that rely on a 
comparison between high-value distractor versus no-distractor trials to claim an effect of 
learned value on attention do not include an unrewarded control condition at all, so evidence 




from these studies should be regarded with caution (Anderson, 2015a, 2015b; Anderson, 
Faulkner, et al., 2013; Anderson, Laurent, et al., 2013, 2014; Anderson, Leal, et al., 2014; 
Anderson & Yantis, 2012; Laurent et al., 2015; Roper et al., 2014).  
There is a simple solution to this problem. Recall that Anderson et al. (2011b) trained 
two colours in their training phase, one paired with high reward and the other with low 
reward. If, on test, the high-value colour were more likely to produce capture than the low-
value colour, this must reflect an influence of reward prediction since this comparison 
controls for all other differences (e.g., both high- and low-value colours were equally likely 
to appear as targets during training and hence selection history is equal for both). This more 
stringent, high-versus-low difference has been reported in some recent studies.5 These studies 
thus demonstrate conclusively that prior learning about the value of an outcome that is 
associated with a stimulus produces a change in the extent to which that stimulus will 
automatically capture attention in the future. This effect can be termed value-modulated 
attentional capture (VMAC). These experiments further suggest that: (1) High-value 
distractors are more likely to capture attention than low-value distractors even when the 
location of the target is known in advance (Wang et al., 2014: see also Munneke, 
Hoppenbrouwers & Theeuwes, 2015). (2) VMAC may be long-lived, lasting for months after 
the initial training phase (Anderson & Yantis, 2013). (3) Learned value can produce 
automatic capture of eye movements (known as oculomotor capture). Theeuwes and 
Belopolsky (2012) used a task similar to that of Anderson et al. (2011b), but with saccades to 
the target stimulus as the response. During the test phase, participants were more likely to 
make saccades towards a high-value distractor than a low-value distractor, even though these 
stimuli were task-irrelevant. (4) VMAC is not restricted to learning about reward. Two 
studies have found greater attentional capture by stimuli paired with large loss of money 
relative to stimuli paired with small (or no) loss (Wang et al., 2013; Wentura et al., 2014). 




Wang et al. also reported greater capture by a stimulus paired with painful shock than by a 
stimulus that was never paired with shock (Van Damme, Crombez, Hermans, Koster & 
Eccleston, 2006 report a similar finding; for a further demonstration of a bias in spatial 
attention towards a stimulus paired with an aversive event [threat], see Field, 2006). These 
findings suggest the crucial determinant of VMAC is the motivational significance of the 
predicted outcome (large rewards and large punishments are more arousing events than are 
small rewards/punishments) rather than the valence of that outcome (whether it is affectively 
positive [appetitive] or negative [aversive]: cf. Kahnt, Park, Haynes & Tobler, 2014). 
Later we shall consider further the nature of the VMAC effect implicated in these 
studies²whether it reflects the development of aQµDWWHQWLRQDOresponse KDELW¶ towards 
stimuli that produce reward, or an increase in the effective salience of those stimuli. First, 
though, we shall look at a related case, but in which reward-learning exerts a shorter-term 
effect on attentional selection. 
Inter-trial priming procedures.  In the studies described in the previous subsection, 
value relationships were constant over the training phase (e.g., responses to red targets were 
paired with large reward, and green targets with low reward, throughout training). The effect 
RIWKHVHµORQJ-WHUP¶DVVRFLDWLRQVthen lingered to influence attention in a test phase which 
occurred minutes (e.g., Anderson et al., 2011b), days (e.g., Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2009), 
or months (e.g., Anderson & Yantis, 2013) later. Other studies have instead looked at short-
term effects of reward learning on attention. Imagine a search task in which the target on each 
trial is either red or green, chosen at random. Suppose that participants must respond to a red 
target on trial T; this will produce a performance benefit on the next trial (T+1) if it also 
features a red target, but a performance decrement if trial T+1 has a green target while a red 
stimulus appears as a distractor (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994, 1996, 2000). This short-term 
effect, wherein target choice on the previous trial influences performance on the current trial, 




is known as inter-trial priming. Notably, several studies of inter-trial priming have provided 
rewards for responding to the target. Whether high or low reward is provided on each trial is 
decided randomly ± unlike in the studies described in the previous subsection, there is no 
consistent relationship between a particular colour and reward magnitude. Crucially, if the 
response to (say) a red target on trial T is highly rewarded, the effect of inter-trial priming on 
trial T+1 is magnified relative to the case where the response to that same red target on trial T 
received low reward.6 This pattern is again consistent with the idea that pairing a stimulus 
with high reward increases the extent to which that stimulus subsequently captures attention, 
making it easier to detect when it is a target and harder to ignore when it is a task-irrelevant 
distractor. Effectively this inter-trial priming procedure condenses the training and test phases 
of the studies in the previous subsection into a pair of trials, where trial T is the training phase, 
and trial T+1 is the test phase. In combination, then, it seems that OHDUQLQJRIµVWDEOH¶UHZDUG
associations can exert a long-term influence on attentional capture, while experience of 
individual and unpredictable stimulus±reward pairings can have a similar, but short-term, 
effect on capture. 
Learned value influences capture by stimuli that have never been task-relevant.  To 
reiterate, studies using distinct training and test phases, or inter-trial priming, share a common 
framework. Initially, responding to a stimulus is paired with high-value reward (either in a 
training phase or on trial T), and later that stimulus is found to be more likely to capture 
attention when it is task-irrelevant (in a test phase, or when it is presented as a distractor on 
trial T+1). Taking a step back, the fact that the reward-predictive stimulus was task-relevant 
during training (or on trial T)²i.e., it was the target that was responded to²means that 
participants needed to quickly orient to this stimulus in order to earn the reward on each 
training trial. As a result, it is possible that attentional capture by reward-related stimuli 
during the test phase (or on trial T+1) was a carryover of the attentional and/or oculomotor 




orienting response that was initially trained. A fundamental principal of reward learning is 
that following an action with reward increases the likelihood that the action will occur in the 
future (the so-called Law of Effect: Thorndike, 1911). Perhaps then, it is not surprising that a 
rapid orienting response that was followed by large reward during training continues to occur 
in a subsequent test phase, even when the response is no longer relevant to the task goals. 
That is, perhaps the attentional and oculomotor orienting observed in these studies reflects a 
learned (conditioned) response that is automatically re-enacted whenever the relevant 
conditioned stimulus appearsLHDQµDWWHQWLRQDOKDELW¶. Now we will consider evidence for 
another form of automatic attentional bias. Here, rather than training an attentional response 
to task-relevant cues, we examine whether cues paired with high-value outcomes can become 
more likely to capture attention²can increase in psychological salience²even though they 
were never task-relevant. 
In a study by Le Pelley, Pearson, Griffiths and Beesley (2015), participants had to move 
their eyes as quickly as possible to a diamond-shaped target among circles, on every trial. A 
distractor circle could appear in either a high-value colour or a low-value colour (red or blue, 
counterbalanced); all other stimuli were grey. On trials with a distractor circle in the high-
value colour, rapid saccades to the diamond earned a large reward. On trials with a low-value 
distractor, rapid saccades to the diamond earned a small reward. Thus while the distractor 
predicted reward value, it was never the stimulus to which people were required to respond 
(or direct their attention) to obtain that reward; the reward-predictive distractors were always 
task-irrelevant. Indeed, if at any point participants looked at the distractor circle, the reward 
on that trial was cancelled; these were termed omission trials. So attending to the distractor 
was counterproductive to SHRSOH¶V goal of maximizing their payoff. The worst thing a 
participant can do under these conditions is to look at a distractor in the high-value colour, 
since that results in loss of a high-value reward. And yet that is exactly what people did: high-




value distractors produced significantly more omission trials than did low-value distractors. 
That is, people were more likely to look at high-value distractors than low-value distractors, 
even though doing so lost them the large reward that they would otherwise have obtained. 
This finding of counterproductive VMAC by task-irrelevant stimuli has proven robust 
(Failing, Nissens, Pearson, Le Pelley & Theeuwes, 2015; Pearson, Donkin, Tran, Most & Le 
Pelley, 2015: for similar findings from related procedures, see also Bucker, Belopolsky & 
Theeuwes, 2015; Buschschulte et al. 2014; Hopf et al. 2015; Mine & Saiki, 2015). 
These findings show that reward learning can modulate attentional capture by stimuli 
even when responding to (or orienting attention towards) those stimuli has never been 
rewarded. The implication is that the influence of learned value on attentional capture (i.e., 
VMAC) is a function of the signal-value of stimuli, rather than their response-value. That is, 
stimuli which signal the availability of high-value outcomes become more likely to capture 
attention. In the terminology of conditioning research, these data suggest that VMAC reflects 
the operation of a Pavlovian, rather than instrumental, learning process.  
Extensions of the basic procedure described above show that: (1) Counterproductive 
VMAC by task-irrelevant stimuli persists over extended training; even with extensive 
experience, participants did not come to show an adaptive pattern wherein they suppressed 
attention to the high-value distractor, which would have increased their payoff (Le Pelley et 
al., 2015). (2) The effect persists when participants are explicitly informed that looking at the 
distractor results in omission of reward, and are told every time this omission occurs (Pearson 
et al., 2015). This finding further demonstrates that people are unable to use controlled 
processes to overcome the effect, even when explicitly motivated to do so. (3) The effect 
occurs when the reward-predictive distractors are physically salient colour singletons (e.g., a 
single red circle among grey shapes: Le Pelley et al., 2015; Pearson et al., 2015), and when 
they are not physically salient (e.g., a red circle among other distinctly coloured shapes, as in 




Figure 2a: Failing et al., 2015: see also Bucker et al., 2015). This last finding suggests that 
learned signal value can modulate the strength of capture that would otherwise by caused by 
physical salience, and drive capture by non-physically salient stimuli in its own right. 
Learned value in nonspatial tasks.  Studies described in the previous section 
investigated the effect of learned value on spatial attention; the extent to which attention is 
allocated to one location rather than another. But spatial attention is only one aspect of 
attentional selection. We can also prioritise detection of events that will occur in a known 
location; e.g., a driver at an intersection knows where the green light will appear, but not 
when. A handful of studies have shown that nonspatial perceptual processing of task-
irrelevant stimuli is also influenced by learned value; either via monetary reward (Della 
Libera & Chelazzi, 2009; Della Libera, Perlato & Chelazzi, 2011; Failing & Theeuwes, 2015), 
or punishment (an aversive loud noise: Smith, Most, Newsome & Zald, 2006). These studies 
show that stimuli previously paired with high-value outcomes (compared to low-value 
outcomes) interfere more strongly with processing of²and responding to²a target when 
they are presented in the same location as that target; either sequentially (Failing & Theeuwes, 
2015; Smith et al., 2006),7 or simultaneously (Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2009; Della Libera et 
al., 2011; Kelly & Forsyth, 2007). As for the spatial studies discussed earlier, this suggests 
that stimuli with high learned value captured attention and so reduced attentional resources 
available for processing the target. However here this capture effect must have been 
nonspatial, since all stimuli were presented in the same location. 
Summary: Learned Value Affects Top-Down and Bottom-Up Attention 
Overall, the pattern of data with respect to learned value is rich and interesting. Just as in the 
case of learned predictiveness, learning about outcome value appears to LQIOXHQFHSHRSOH¶V
allocation of attention in a strategic, top-down way. However, the influence of learned value 




on attention is not entirely under our control. Studies of value-modulated attentional capture 
(VMAC) show that stimuli that predict high-value outcomes (positively or negatively 
valenced) become more likely to capture our attention (both spatially and nonspatially) in an 
automatic, bottom-up fashion. This attentional bias could be due to a habitual orienting 
response (DQµattentional habit¶) or to a change in effective salience of stimuli brought about 
by changes in their signal value. It is not possible to say for certain which of these two 
potential mechanisms is responsible for the effects seen in the training phase ± test phase and 
the intertrial priming procedures described above ± both can explain the observed data. We 
can be more certain, however, of the mechanism at work in procedures in which reward-
predictive stimuli are task-irrelevant throughout. Here, attentional orienting to the high-value 
cues is never rewarded and so it is not possible for an attentional habit to have developed. 
The attentional bias must, therefore, be a consequence of the signal value of the cues and 
hence their ability to capture attention. We now turn to potential theoretical models of all of 
the empirical data we have reviewed. 
Modelling Effects of Predictiveness and Value 
In the previous section, we saw that there is now abundant evidence demonstrating that 
stimuli associated with high-value outcomes receive greater attention than those associated 
with low-value outcomes. Earlier in the article, we reviewed the substantial evidence in 
support of the predictiveness principle ± stimuli that are more predictive of outcomes (i.e., 
that provide more information regarding which outcome will occur) tend to receive more 
attention than stimuli that are less predictive. 7KLVILQGLQJILWVZHOOZLWK0DFNLQWRVK¶V
model and its relatives. In contrast, the Pearce-Hall model, and the uncertainty principle on 
which it is based, did not receive strong support from the data. In this section we will 
consider how models of the predictiveness principle can be extended such that both 




predictiveness and learned value might be reconciled within a simple, single framework.  
Applying Mackintosh (1975) to Learned Value 
As noted earlier, the suggestion of a relationship between learning and attention is not novel. 
William James described the possibility in 1890, and formal attentional models of associative 
learning have existed for over 50 years (Mackintosh, 1975, provides an early review). Most 
of the previous research on attentional learning in the associative tradition has tended to focus 
on learned predictiveness and uncertainty, rather than learned value, and the development of 
theories reflects this (e.g., Kruschke, 2001b; Le Pelley, 2004; Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & 
Hall, 1980). Nevertheless, these theories can potentially also be applied to account for effects 
RIOHDUQHGYDOXHRQDWWHQWLRQ&RQVLGHU0DFNLQWRVK¶VPRGHOZKLFK implements the 
predictiveness principle. This model states that following each learning trial, the associative 
strength of each presented stimulus A (VA) is updated according to the following equation: 
¿8º L 5=º:IF 8º;   [1], 
where S is a fixed learning-rate parameter. As discussed earlier, the prediction error ± VA) 
represents the discrepancy between the actual magnitude of the outcome on a WULDODQGWKH
extent to which stimulus A predicts that outcome (associative strength of A, VA). Critically, 
.A is a variable representing the attention paid to stimulus A. Let X represent all other stimuli 
that are presented simultaneously with stimulus A on a given trial. According to 
0DFNLQWRVK¶Voriginal PRGHO.LVGHWHUPLQHGE\FRPSDULQJKRZZHOOWKHRXWFRPHLV
predicted by A (given by the absolute value of the pUHGLFWLRQHUURUIRU$_± VA|), with how 
ZHOOWKHRXWFRPHLVSUHGLFWHGE\;JLYHQE\_± VX|). If A is a better predictor of the 
RXWFRPHWKDQLV;WKHQDWWHQWLRQWR$.AVKRXOGLQFUHDVHLI$LVDSRRUHUSUHGLFWRUWKHQ.A 
should decrease. However, beyond this general principle, Mackintosh gave no specific 
algorithm for determining changes in .. Following Le Pelley (2004), perhaps the simplest 
expression for updating .A WKDWLVFRQVLVWHQWZLWK0DFNLQWRVK¶VSULQFLSOHLV 




¿=º L E:IF 8ÑF IF 8º;  [2], 
ZKHUHLVDIL[HGUDWH SDUDPHWHUDQG.A is constrained to lie between a lower limit 
(representing minimal attention: here we use 0.1) and an upper limit (representing maximal 
attention: here we use 1). Further details and simulations of this model are provided by Le 
Pelley (2004).  
In this model, attention to predictive stimuli will tend to increase towards the upper 
limit, regardless of exactly what outcome they predict. However, the rate of this increase 
GHSHQGVRQWKHYDOXHRIWKHRXWFRPH7KLVLVEHFDXVHHDUO\LQWUDLQLng when VA is small, a 
ODUJHYDOXHRIZLOOSURGXFHDODUJHSUHGLFWLRQHUURULQ(TXDWLRQ>@DQGKHQFHUDSLGOHDUQing. 
Thus cue A will rapidly become established as a better predictor of the outcome than are 
other simultaneously-presented stimuli, X (e.g., the experimental context), so attention to cue 
A will increase quickly according to Equation [2]. Consequently, at least early in training this 
model correctly anticipates greater attention to stimuli that predict a high-value outcome (e.g., 
a large reward) than those that predict a low-value outcome (Figure 3a). However, at 
asymptote the model anticipates that attention will depend on learned predictiveness 
(attention will be greater to predictive than nonpredictive cues) but not learned value (i.e., 
attention will not depend on the value of the outcome that a predictive cue predicts). That is, 
this model anticipates that the influence of learned value on attention will decrease as training 
proceeds. However, this pattern runs against the findings of Le Pelley et al. (2015), who 
found that the effect of learned value showed no sign of decreasing over extended training, 
and if anything tended to increase as training continued. 
A Simpler Model: Attention Is Determined by Associative Strength 
In fact, it is straightforward to modify the approach described above so that it is better-
equipped to account for both learned value and the predictiveness principle, even after 
extended training. Rather than basing attention on a comparison of the predictiveness of 




different stimuli (as in Equation [2]), an alternative approach has attention to a cue 
determined by the absolute associative strength of that cue: 
=º L 8º  [3], 
2QFHDJDLQZHVHWDORZHUOLPLWIRU.of 0.1, representing minimal attention.8 The resulting 
model still accounts for most demonstrations of an attentional advantage for predictive over 
nonpredictive stimuli, because the predictive stimuli in these studies typically have greater 
associative strength ± since a predictive cue is consistently paired with the same outcome, it 
will develop a strong association with that outcome. Notably, in this alternative model, 
attention is also a direct function of learned value. This is because asymptotic associative 
strengths for stimuli paired with high-value outcomes will be greater than for stimuli paired 
with low-value outcomes (Figure 3b). (Formally: According to Equation [1], learning reaches 
asymptote when VA = VLQFHDV\PSWRWLFVA GHSHQGVRQRXWFRPHPDJQLWXGHWKHQ
DFFRUGLQJWR(TXDWLRQ>@DV\PSWRWLF.A ZLOODOVRGHSHQGRQ$PRUHFRPSOH[DQG
probably more representative, model implementing attentional learning along these lines has 
recently been developed by Esber and Haselgrove (2011). 
The idea that attention towards a cue increases to the extent that it predicts a high-value 
outcome² attention is determined by associative strength²is very intuitive, and is consistent 
with the idea that attention goes to cues that are known to be significant (Mackintosh, 1975). 
It is also supported by studies from the learned predictiveness literature which indicate that 
attention is modulated by absolute predictiveness (e.g., how strongly do apples predict illness? 
How strongly do bananas predict illness?), as in Equation 3, rather than a comparison of the 
relative predictiveness of different cues presented on the same trial (which of apples or 
bananas is the better predictor of illness?), as in Equation 2 (Beesley & Le Pelley, 2010; 
Kattner, 2015; Le Pelley, Turnbull, et al., 2010; Livesey et al., 2011).  
This simpler model, in which attention is proportional to associative strength, is 




generally successful in accounting for empirical effects of both learned predictiveness and 
learned value. However, a challenge comes from another phenomenon ± the inverse base rate 
effect. Here, there is some evidence that predictive cues command more attention than their 
less predictive competitors (i.e., that attention is determined by a comparison of relative 
predictiveness, as specified by Mackintosh, 1975) even when the less predictive cues have 
higher associative strength. 
The inverse base rate effect.  The inverse base-rate effect (IBRE: Medin & Edelson, 
1988), and the analogous highlighting effect (Collins, Percy, Smith & Kruschke, 2011; 
Dennis & Kruschke, 1998; Kruschke, 1996a, 2009; Kruschke et al., 2005; Sewell & 
Lewandowsky, 2012), seem to conflict with the idea that attention can simply be equated 
with associative strength. In the IBRE, a compound of two cues predicts a commonly 
occurring outcome (AB o common), while an overlapping cue-compound predicts a rarer 
outcome (AC o rare). Cue B is thus a perfect predictor of the common outcome, C is a 
perfect predictor of the rare outcome, and A is an imperfect predictor. On test, when 
presented with compound BC participants typically report expecting the rare outcome 
(predicted by C). This is noteworthy, as both B and C are equally predictive of their 
respective outcomes, and since the outcome of B is more common, a rational person should 
predict the common outcome when presented with BC. 
Of course, cue familiarity is not equated in the IBRE design, and so the relative novelty 
of cue C provides one possible explanation for why participants seem to place more weight 
on it. However, simply pairing one cue with its outcome more often than another cue does not 
produce the effect: the shared cue A is crucial. Thus, training on FD o common and GE o 
rare leads to the reverse of the IBRE effect. That is, participants select the common disease in 
response to DE (Kruschke, 2001a; Medin & Edelson, 1988; Medin & Robbins, 1971; Wills, 




Lavric, Hemmings & Surrey, 2014). It is not, therefore, cue-familiarity that drives the IBRE. 
Instead, choice of the rare outcome when presented with BC can be explained if it is 
DVVXPHGWKDWVRPHDVSHFWRISDUWLFLSDQWV¶H[SHULHQFHKDVFDXVHGWKHPWRDWWHQGPRUHWR&
than to B. Support for an attentional interpretation of the IBRE comes from eye-tracking 
findings showing greater overt attention to C than to B following AB o common and 
AC o rare training (Kruschke et al., 2005). Furthermore, using EEG, Wills et al. (2014) 
showed that a validated neural marker of selective attention was also modulated by IBRE 
training, consistent with greater attention to C than to B. 
 Why is attention to C greater than to B in the IBRE? It is at this point that our simple 
model, in which attention is determined by associative strength (Equation [3]) is found 
wanting. In some studies of the IBRE, as well as being tested with the BC compound, 
participants have also been presented with B alone and C alone during the test phase. In many 
(but not all) cases where an IBRE is observed, accuracy in predicting the common outcome 
for cue B alone numerically exceeds accuracy for predicting the rare outcome for cue C alone 
(Bohil, Markman & Maddox, 2005; Medin & Edelson, 1988; Wills et al., 2014; Winman, 
Wennerholm, Juslin & Shanks, 2005); in one case (Wills et al., 2014) this advantage for B 
over C was tested statistically, and shown to be significant. So the IBRE can be observed 
even when C has (if anything) a lower associative strength than B. As such, we cannot easily 
explain an attentional advantage for C over B in terms of our model which equates attention 
with associative strength. 
In contrast, the attentional advantage for C over B emerges more naturally from an 
account in which attention is based on a comparison of the relative predictiveness of different 
FXHVSUHVHQWHGWRJHWKHURQDWULDODVLQ0DFNLQWRVK¶VRULJLQDOPRGHO(TXation [2]). 
Briefly, the shared cue A is more predictive of the common outcome presented on AB trials 
than it is the rare outcome presented on AC trials. Hence cue A competes more effectively for 




attention with B than it does with C, and so attention to C increases relative to B. 
One possible way of reconciling the IBRE findings with our model equating attention 
with associative strength is to appeal to the role of the experimental context. On the basis of 
our model, the attentional advantage for C over B in the IBRE suggests that the Bocommon 
association is weaker than the Corare association. If the context comes to be associated 
more strongly with the common outcome than the rare outcome, this could explain why 
people are nevertheless more likely to correctly choose common when presented with B alone 
than they are to choose rare when presented with C alone. This possibility remains to be 
tested empirically. 
In conclusion, our attempt to develop a unified theory of learned predictiveness and 
learned value has met with some success. Most of the data presented in this review are 
captured by the idea that learning increases attention to cues to the extent that those cues 
acquire associative strength. The IBRE represents the single exception to this rule of which 
we are aware. It may be that future research will show how the IBRE can be reconciled with 
the simple model, or we may have to think along different lines in order to account for all of 
the data within a single model. We turn now to a final summary and concluding comments on 
the literature concerning associative learning and attention. 
Summary and Conclusions 
There is an abundance of evidence for attentional learning in humans. Attention is influenced 
both by learning about the predictiveness of a stimulus (how much information it provides 
about other, outcome events) and about its value (how significant²rewarding, punishing²
those outcome events are). Furthermore, both of these phenomena manifest themselves as 
both top-down (controlled) and bottom-up (automatic) attentional biases. Taken together, 
these findings suggest a fundamental relationship between learning and attention, wherein 




learning leads to prioritisation²both controlled and automatic²of those stimuli likely to be 
of greatest importance ± cues that predict motivationally significant events. In turn, studies of 
associability show that the resulting attentional biases can themselves modulate the rate of 
future learning about the stimuli involved (predictive cues are subsequently learned about 
faster), such that the attention±learning relationship is truly interactive. 
We propose that the effects of learned predictiveness and learned value are unlikely to 
be the consequence of entirely separate processes or systems. Intuitively, these two effects 
seem intimately related. So it would be desirable, if possible, to explain all of the observed 
phenomena within a single model. Our attempts above met with some success. A simple 
PRGHOLQZKLFKDFXH¶VDVVRFLDWLYHVWUHQJWKmodulates attention explains most of the 
available data. Some evidence for a dissociation between associative strength and attention 
can be seen, however, in the inverse base rate effect; in this case, attention seems to go to the 
target cue that has lower associative strength. More theoretical and empirical work is thus 
required to provide a single simple model of learned predictiveness and learned value.  
Clinical Application 
Beyond its theoretical importance, an improved understanding of the processes underlying 
the relationship between learning and attention has clinical significance. In particular, many 
drugs of abuse produce potent neural reward signals (Dayan, 2009; Hyman, 2005; Robinson 
& Berridge, 2001). The ideas advanced in this article might lead us to expect that drug users 
will show enhanced attention to stimuli that are associated with these drug rewards (such as 
drug paraphernalia, or people and locations associated with drug supply). This is exactly what 
is observed: for example, people who are substance-use dependent show particular difficulty 
in processing a nonsalient target stimulus in the presence of a drug-related distractor stimulus 
(for reviews, see Field & Cox, 2008; Field, Munafo & Franken, 2009).  
In fact, recent work using a value-modulated capture procedure suggests that addicts 




also show a heightened attentional bias for stimuli associated with nondrug (monetary) 
reward (Anderson, Faulkner, et al., 2013). This finding suggests that individual differences in 
susceptibility to substance abuse disorders may reflect, in part, differences in the level of a 
more general predisposition to develop attentional biases towards reward-related stimuli. 
Moreover, the extent of the attentional bias towards drug-related stimuli in recovering addicts 
is known to predict relapse (Cox, Hogan, Kristian & Race, 2002; Marissen et al., 2006; 
Waters et al., 2003). Such research raises the possibility that if such attentional biases could 
be reduced, the likelihood of relapse might also fall.  
The issue of the automaticity of value-modulated attention is relevant here. We saw 
earlier that the influence of reward learning on attention reflects (at least in part) an automatic, 
involuntary process that is cognitively impenetrable. The implication is that mere instruction 
is likely to be ineffective in reducing the magnitude of maladaptive attentional biases. Instead, 
attentional re-training may be required for a full resolution. Consistent with this idea, a recent 
large-scale study of alcohol-dependent individuals has shown that a cognitive re-training 
procedure can indeed reduce relapse rates at one year by up to 10% (Eberl et al., 2013; see 
also Fadardi & Cox, 2009; Schoenmakers et al., 2010). Work has just begun to emerge 
investigating the effect of reward on attentional bias training for clinical disorders 
(Sigurjonsdottir, Bjornsson, Ludvigsdottir & Kristjansson, 2015), and this area represents an 
exciting potential application of the findings from the learned attention literature. 
Conclusion  
The survey above describes a research area that is rich in findings and also rich in potential. 
There are aspects of learned attention that we now understand well. The other areas, about 
which we know considerably less, will no doubt become the focus of intense investigation. 
There are four areas that we have identified as being (at least to us) especially interesting. 
Firstly, there is abundant evidence for the predictiveness principle (in which attention is 




preferentially allocated to cues that accurately predict their consequences), but relatively little 
support in human studies for the uncertainty principle (in which attention is preferentially 
allocated to cues whose outcome is currently unknown). These findings in humans stand in 
contrast to the literature on attentional learning in nonhuman animals, in which there have 
been many reports of data consistent with the uncertainty principle (see Pearce & Mackintosh, 
2010, for a review; see Holland & Maddux, 2010, for a detailed examination of the neural 
basis of uncertainty-related effects in animals). While the predictiveness principle and the 
uncertainty principle are seemingly in opposition, they can be reconciled in hybrid attentional 
models (George & Pearce, 2012; Le Pelley, 2004, 2010; Pearce & Mackintosh, 2010). Future 
research should aim to establish the role (if any) of the uncertainty principle in humans, in 
order to determine whether such hybrid models must be considered in the context of human 
attentional learning. One suggestion (though there are other possibilities) is that evidence for 
the uncertainty principle might be obtained in learning environments that encourage 
exploration rather than exploitation (Beesley et al., 2015).  
Secondly, we would be keen to know how far a simple model, in which attention is 
determined by associative strength, can go in explaining effects of both learned predictiveness 
and learned value. This might begin with further work looking at the inverse base rate effect, 
which provides possibly the strongest argument against the simple associative strength model. 
There are also two further areas of exciting research that have really only just begun. 
One is the examination of the effects on attention of outcome predictability (Griffiths, 
Mitchell, Bethmont & Lovibond, 2015). There is some suggestion here that outcomes that 
have been predictable in the past might be learned about more easily than outcomes that were 
unpredictable. This emerging research suggests that there may be some symmetry between 
cues and outcomes with respect to learned predictiveness.  
Finally, there are the fascinating findings concerning the automaticity of learned 




attention. That is, when a participant has learned that a cue is predictive of a significant 
outcome (perhaps one of high value) they then pay attention to that cue in an automatic and 
involuntary manner. These findings have the potential to change the way in which 
psychologists think about attention. Often, controlled attention is referred to as goal-directed 
or endogenous, whereas automatic attention is referred to as stimulus-driven or exogenous 
(Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Jonides, 1981; Posner, 1980; Posner & Cohen, 1984; Yantis, 
2000). Goal-directed processes refer to subject-GULYHQDWWHQWLRQWKDWHQFRPSDVVHVDSHUVRQ¶V
intentions. In contrast, stimulus-driven attentional processes relate to attention-grabbing 
characteristics that are intrinsic to the stimulus and which we cannot control; its brightness, 
onset, colour, etc. The automatic attention that participants pay to cues that predict valued 
outcomes is not goal-directed or under top-down control, but neither is it driven by the 
intrinsic, physical properties of the stimulus. Rather, the change in effective salience of the 
cue is the result of training; iWFRPHVDERXWDVDFRQVHTXHQFHRIWKHSDUWLFLSDQW¶Vexperience 
with, and memory of, that cue and its relationship to other events. It would appear that what 
has been uncovered is a form of attentional bias²derived attention²that does not fit the 
standard goal-directed/stimulus-driven distinction. While William James (1890/1983) 
introduced the concept of derived attention over 125 years ago, the importance of this 
interface between learning and other aspects of cognition is only now becoming apparent. 
  








  (Buckley, Smith & Haselgrove, 2014; Dixon, Ruppel, Pratt & De Rosa, 2009; Eimas, 1966; 
George & Kruschke, 2012; Isaacs & Duncan, 1962; Kruschke, 1996b; Livesey & McLaren, 
2007; Macho, 1997; Maes, Damen & Eling, 2004; Maes, Eling, Wezenberg, Vissers & Kan, 
2011; Maes, Vich & Eling, 2006; Owen, Roberts, Polkey, Sahakian & Robbins, 1991; Van 
der Molen et al., 2012; Whitney & White, 1993: see also Ahmed & Lovibond, 2015; Slabosz 
et al, 2006; Suret & McLaren, 2003; Liu, Mercado, Church & Orduna, 2008) 
2
  (Beesley & Le Pelley, 2010; Bonardi, Graham, Hall & Mitchell, 2005; Buckley, Smith & 
Haselgrove, 2015; Don & Livesey, 2015; Griffiths & Mitchell, 2008; Le Pelley, Beesley & 
Griffiths, 2011; Le Pelley, Calvini & Spears, 2013; Le Pelley, Oakeshott, Wills & McLaren, 
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Mitchell, Griffiths, Seetoo & Lovibond, 2012; Morris, Griffiths, Le Pelley & Weickert, 2013; 
Shone, Harris & Livesey, 2015: see also Kersten, Goldstone & Schaffert, 1998) 
3
  Some studies of blocking have found evidence of greater overt attention to the pretrained 
cue A than to the blocked cue B (Ellis et al., 2014; Le Pelley et al., 2007). This finding is 
consistent with the predictiveness principle (since pretraining renders A a better predictor of 
the outcome), but not with the uncertainty principle (since pretraining means that the outcome 
on AB trials is, if anything, less surprising given the presence of A than the presence of B). 
However, the difference in predictiveness between A and B is confounded with a difference 
 





in familiarity (pretraining means that A is experienced more times than has B). Given the 
possibility that familiarity might exert an independent effect on attention, the finding of 
greater attention to A than B provides somewhat ambiguous support for the predictiveness 
principle over the uncertainty principle. 
4
  (Balcetis, Dunning & Granot, 2012; Brielmann & Spering, 2015; Bucker, Silvis, Donk & 
Theeuwes, 2015; Chapman, Gallivan & Enns, 2015; Chapman, Gallivan, Wong, Wispinski & 
Enns, 2015; Chelazzi et al., 2014; Chen, Mihalas, Niebur & Stuphorn, 2013; Della Libera & 
Chelazzi, 2009; Doallo, Patai & Nobre, 2013; Eckstein, Schoonveld, Zhang, Mack & Akbas, 
2015; Field et al., 2011; Garland, Froeliger, Passik & Howard, 2013; Hardman, Scott, Field 
& Jones, 2014; Hickey & Peelen, 2015; Hogarth, Dickinson & Duka, 2005, 2009; Hogarth, 
Dickinson, Hutton, Elbers & Duka, 2006; Hogarth, Dickinson, Janowski, Nikitina & Duka, 
2008; Hogarth, Dickinson, Wright, Kouvaraki & Duka, 2007; Kiss, Driver & Eimer, 2009; 
Kristjansson, Sigurjonsdottir & Driver, 2010; Le Pelley, Mitchell, et al., 2013; Lee & 
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O'Brien, 2009; Rothkirch et al., 2013; see also Rutherford, O'Brien & Raymond, 2010) 
conflated learned value and learned predictiveness: stimuli differed both in the nature of the 
 





outcome they were paired with (gain or loss of money), and the probability with which that 
outcome occurred. Hence it is unclear which was responsible for the differences in attention 
observed during the test phase of these studies. 
5
  (Anderson, Laurent & Yantis, 2011a, 2012; Anderson & Yantis, 2013; Failing & 
Theeuwes, 2014; Gong & Li, 2014; Hickey & Peelen, 2015; Infanti, Hickey & Turatto, 2015; 
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& Belopolsky, 2012; Wang, Duan, Theeuwes & Zhou, 2014; Wentura, Muller & 
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6
  (Asgeirsson & Kristjansson, 2014; Braem, Hickey, Duthoo & Notebaert, 2014; Camara, 
Manohar & Husain, 2013; Hickey, Chelazzi & Theeuwes, 2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2014; Hickey, 
Kaiser & Peelen, 2015; Hickey & Los, 2015; Hickey & van Zoest, 2013; see also Itthipuripat, 
Cha, Rangsipat & Serences, 2015) 
7
  In the study by Failing and Theeuwes (2015), the difference in reward history of the 
different categories during the test phase is confounded with a difference in their selection 
history: high-value stimuli were chosen more frequently as targets during the preceding 
training phase, raising the possibility that it is this greater selection history (rather than the 
difference in learned value) that drives greater capture by these stimuli on test. 
8
  One problem that immediately arises from this change is that the resulting model is no 
longer able to account for cue competition effects such as overshadowing and blocking 
(described earlier). The simple solution is to amend Equation [1] to use a summed prediction 
error, such that changes in the associative strength of cue A are based on the summed 
 





DVVRFLDWLYHVWUHQJWKRIDOOSUHVHQWHGFXHVV), i.e. ¿8º L 5=º:IF Ã8;. This expression for 
changes in associative strength, which is the same as that of the well-known model by 
Rescorla and Wagner (1972), allows the model to account for cue competition effects such as 
overshadowing and blocking (see Le Pelley, 2004, for detailed discussion). For example, the 
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Figure 1.  Example sequence of events on a trial in the study by Livesey, Harris and Harris 
(2009). The initial asterisk signals the beginning of the trial. A series of letters is then 
presented rapidly (~100 ms per item). Two of these letters (the targets, T1 and T2) appear in 
red. The final mask (hash symbol) is immediately followed by a response cue ± either the left 
or right circle lights up, and participants must press a corresponding button as quickly as 
possible. After making this response, participants are asked to report T1 and T2 in turn. 
Certain letters that appeared as target T2 predicted the correct left/right response that would 
be required by the response cue; participants were better at detecting these predictive target 
letters than other, nonpredictive target letters. 
 
Figure 2.  Example stimulus displays from the training phase (a) and test phase (b) of the 
study by Anderson, Laurent and Yantis (2011a). In the training phase, the target was a red or 
green circle; in the test phase, the target was a shape singleton (either a diamond among 
circles, as here, or a circle among diamonds). Participants responded to the orientation 
(horizontal or vertical) of the line segment contained in the target. During training, rapid 
correct responses received reward, with the amount of reward depending on the colour of the 
target circle. A high-value distractor colour typically predicted large reward; a low-value 
colour typically predicted small reward. 
 
Figure 3.  6LPXODWLRQUHVXOWVXVLQJYDULDQWVRI0DFNLQWRVK¶VDWWHQWLRQDOWKHRU\RI
associative learning. Simulations comprised 100 trials on which cues A and X were together 
paired with an outcome (AX+), alternated with 100 trials on which X alone was presented 
without the outcome (X-). Thus A represents a reliable predictor of the outcome, while X 
represents a nonpredictive stimulus. Upper panels show the associative strength of A (VA) 




across training, and lower panels show attention to A (DA). Blue lines show simulation results 
for a high-value outcome (O = 0.8), and red lines show results for a low-value outcome (O = 
0.3). (a) Attention calculated based on a comparison of relative predictiveness (Equation [2]). 
Since A is the most predictive stimulus regardless of outcome magnitude, DA increases to the 
upper limit of 1 in both cases. However, it approaches this limit more rapidly when outcome 
magnitude is large (O = 0.8) than when it is small (O = 0.3). So this model anticipates an 
influence of learned value on attention early in training, but not at asymptote. [Other 
parameters: S = T = 0.2]. (b) Attention determined by absolute associative strength (Equation 
[3]). As A develops associative strength, DA increases for both O = 0.8 and O = 0.3. However, 
since attention is determined by associative strength, which is in turn limited by O, asymptotic 
attention is greater when outcome magnitude is larger than when it is small. So this simpler 
model anticipates a persistent influence of learned value on attention. [Other parameter: S = 
0.3]. (Figure taken from Le Pelley, Beesley & Griffiths, in press) 
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